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Article 
Toward a Critical Race Theory of 
Evidence 
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose† 
  INTRODUCTION   
“It’s not what you know, it’s what you can prove in court!”1 
This oft-used movie line shows how even Hollywood recog-
nizes the importance of evidence law. At trial, the facts are not 
determined through an independent investigation of the truth2 
but by how the rules of evidence are employed to admit or ex-
clude evidence. Attorneys use evidence rules to establish the 
story that the finder of fact, be it a judge or jury, considers in 
rendering its findings or verdicts. It is often taken for granted 
that evidence law applies equally to all persons and provides 
everyone an equal voice in the courtroom, irrespective of race. 
This Article challenges these assumptions and reveals how evi-
dence law and practice structurally disadvantages people of 
color. 
In courtrooms across the United States, certain evidence 
receives racially disparate admissibility treatment. Evidence of 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I 
am grateful to the University of Pittsburgh School of Law’s Derrick A. Bell 
Fund for Excellence Award and its Bell Fellow, Alexandra Farone, for provid-
ing research assistance and support for this project. I am also indebted to Jes-
sie Allen, Megan Block, I. Bennett Capers, Montré Carodine, Richard Delgado, 
Andrea Freeman, Jules Lobel, Benjamin Minegar, Anna Roberts, and Lu-in 
Wang for insightful feedback. Copyright © 2017 by Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose. 
 1. LAW ABIDING CITIZEN (The Film Department 2009); see also TRAINING 
DAY (Village Roadshow Pictures 2001) (omitting but implying “in court”). 
 2. Our adversarial common law system is party-controlled, where facts 
are developed on the parties’ initiative, as compared to inquisitorial civil law 
systems where the judge has broad discretion to guide the discovery process 
and evaluate the evidence. See Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litiga-
tion: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared, 22 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 193, 195–96 (2002). 
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the “racialized reality”3—the lived experience of racial differen-
tiation and hierarchy—of white people is too often submitted to 
juries with little to no evidentiary scrutiny, while the racialized 
reality of people of color is routinely excluded, even when sup-
ported by evidence-based social science. When the racialized 
reality of minorities is admitted into evidence, it often comes in 
only through expert witnesses’ white or “insider” voices.4 This 
amounts to a dual-race5 evidentiary system reminiscent of an-
tiquated laws that allowed whites to testify against anyone but 
barred people of color from testifying against whites.6 However, 
unlike these outdated race-based witness competency rules, to-
day’s evidentiary racial disparities appear race-neutral. 
This Article applies—and, more importantly, calls for in-
creased application of—Critical Race Theory (CRT) to the law 
of evidence. Critical race evidentiary inquiry is valuable be-
cause it exposes how the law of evidence can insidiously oper-
ate to perpetuate racial subordination. Though scholars have 
applied CRT to other fields of law, including tax,7 contracts,8 
and property,9 too few have applied it to evidence law.10 Anti-
discrimination scholarship on the intersection of evidence law 
and race is sparse and often overlooks the institutionalized 
manner in which evidence law replicates and perpetuates socie-
tal discrimination in the courtroom. Evidentiary rulings ulti-
mately determine substantive outcomes. Thus, those concerned 
 
 3. The original concept of “racialized reality evidence” is introduced and 
explained infra Part II.B. 
 4. See infra Part II.B.5. 
 5. The term “dual-race” evidentiary system refers to the disparate 
treatment of white racialized reality evidence in comparison to the racialized 
reality evidence of people of color. 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. See, e.g., CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Anthony C. 
Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009); ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RA-
CIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK TAX (2015). 
 8. See, e.g., Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the 
Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract 
Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Brenna Bhandar, Critical Legal Studies and the Politics of 
Property, 3 PROP. L. REV. 186 (2014); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). 
 10. See, e.g., Montré D. Carodine, Contemporary Issues in Critical Race 
Theory: The Implications of Race as Character Evidence in Recent High-Profile 
Cases, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 679, 681 (2014) (“Interestingly, however, in tradi-
tional evidence law and criminal law scholarship as well as in critical race 
theory scholarship, race as an evidentiary concept is largely overlooked.”). A 
notable exception is the work of Carodine herself. See infra note 71. 
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about justice in the legal process should pause to consider how 
the application of evidence law might subordinate racial minor-
ities and could undergo reform to increase fairness. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that 
CRT is a useful lens to uncover racial subordination imbedded 
in evidence law. Specifically, this segment looks at historical 
race-based witness competency statutes and outlines the criti-
cal race theoretical precepts needed to expose their present day 
vestiges. Part II applies a critical race evidentiary inquiry to 
stand-your-ground defenses, flight from racially targeted police 
profiling and violence, and cross-racial witness identifications. 
The examination of stand-your-ground defenses explores how 
racial character evidence is considered by fact-finders even 
though it is not formally introduced or admissible. The investi-
gation of the relevance of flight introduces the concept of 
“racialized reality evidence” and demonstrates how evidence of 
people of color’s lived experiences of systemic racism are regu-
larly excluded at trial, while evidence of white norms and be-
liefs receives “implicit judicial notice.” Critical scrutiny of cross-
racial witness identifications provides examples of the eviden-
tiary barriers criminal defendants of color face when they seek 
to introduce evidence countering systemic racism. Part III ex-
amines the structural causes of the modern dual-race eviden-
tiary system and offers suggestions about how critical eviden-
tiary analysis by the bench, bar, and academy—including a 
reinterpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403—could make 
evidence law more equitable. 
I.  RACE AND RACISM IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE   
Before evaluating the contemporary racial landscape of ev-
idence law and proposing reforms, it is prudent to pause for 
retrospection on the law of evidence and supply a framework 
for its critique. Section A explores eighteenth and nineteenth 
century race-based witness competency rules. Section B then 
provides the central precepts and queries of a critical race evi-
dentiary analysis, while Section C explains the practical func-
tion of such an analysis. 
A. LOOKING BACK: RACE-BASED WITNESS COMPETENCY RULES 
Today, evidence rules, doctrines, and policies appear race-
neutral, but this was not always the case. In the eighteenth 
through mid-to-late nineteenth centuries, laws barred people of 
color from testifying in court, especially if the case involved a 
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white person. For instance, the California Crimes and Punish-
ments Act of 1850 provided that “no black or mulatto person, or 
Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of or 
against any white person.”11 Its civil equivalent similarly di-
rected that “[n]o Indian or Negro shall be allowed to testify as a 
witness in any action in which a White person is a party.”12 
These racial restrictions were not limited to Native and black 
Americans; they applied to other populations of color as well.13 
Most famously, in the 1854 case of People v. Hall, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that its witness competency statute 
barred testimony of witnesses of Chinese descent and all per-
sons who were not white.14 In Hall, a white man had been con-
victed of murdering a Chinese miner on the basis of testimony 
by Chinese witnesses.15 The defendant appealed, claiming that 
the state’s racial evidentiary bar prohibiting testimony by 
blacks, mulattoes, and Indians against whites should be ex-
tended to bar the testimony of Chinese people.16 The Supreme 
Court of California agreed, finding that the statute’s reference 
to “black persons” “must be taken as contradistinguished from 
White, and necessarily excludes all races other than the Cauca-
sian.”17 Accordingly, the court held that the Chinese witnesses’ 
testimony should have been excluded at trial and reversed the 
conviction.18 
Motivated by white supremacy, the court in Hall recog-
nized the fundamental connection between people’s ability to 
testify in court and their status as full citizens, observing: 
The same rule which would admit [non-white people] to testify, would 
admit them to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we might soon 
see them at the polls, in the jury box, upon the bench, and in our leg-
islative halls. 
 
 11. People v. Howard, 17 Cal. 63, 64 (1860) (quoting the California Crimes 
and Punishments Act of 1850, § 14). 
 12. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399 (1854) (quoting the California Civil 
Practice Act, § 394). 
 13. Id. at 404. 
 14. Id. at 399, 404; see also Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance” in 
Court: Asian Pacific Americans and Racial Rules of Evidence, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 965, 967 (2013). 
 15. Hall, 4 Cal. at 399. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 404. 
 18. Id. at 405. 
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 This is not a speculation which exists in the excited and over-
heated imagination of the patriot and statesman, but it is an actual 
and present danger.19 
It is not surprising that three years later, a San Francisco 
court denied a Mexican American man the right to testify at 
trial.20 Manuel Domínguez was one of California’s most distin-
guished and affluent citizens and served on the Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors.21 Despite his vast landholdings 
and social and political prominence, he was dismissed as a wit-
ness after plaintiff ’s counsel argued that his Indian blood made 
him incompetent to testify.22 As mestizos, individuals with a 
mix of Spanish and American Indian descent, Mexican Ameri-
cans were barred from testifying on the basis of their race.23 
California was not the only state imposing race-based wit-
ness competency requirements in the nineteenth century.24 
Throughout most of the country, statutes and judicial decrees 
prohibited blacks and other people of color from testifying in 
cases in which white people were parties.25 In slave-holding 
states, as well as several western and midwestern states, this 
bar was usually based explicitly on race.26 In some northern 
states, the restrictions focused more on slave status,27 though 
being black carried a presumption of slave status and thus wit-
ness incompetency.28 In some states, such as Delaware, black 
 
 19. Id. at 404. 
 20. See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR 
JUSTICE 66 (2009); JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RE-
SOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 296 (3d ed. 2015). 
 21. PEREA ET AL., supra note 20. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Nearly all of the southern states and several of the northern states 
prohibited people of color from testifying against whites. I. Bennett Capers, 
The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1377 (2010) (citing 
THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 239–48 
(1996); Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal 
Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. 
J. RACE & L. 261 (1996)). 
 25. Alfred Avins, The Right To Be a Witness and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 31 MO. L. REV. 471, 473 & n.17 (1966) (stating that many of these stat-
utes are “collected in Senator Sumner’s report entitled To Secure Equality Be-
fore the Law in the Courts of the United States, [S. REP. NO. 38-25, at 2–6] 
(1864)”). 
 26. Id. at 473–74. 
 27. Id. at 473 (citing Rogers’ Ex’rs v. Berry, 10 Johns. 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1813)). 
 28. Id. at 473–74 (citing Fox v. Lambson, 8 N.J.L. 275 (N.J. 1826)). 
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witnesses were allowed to testify on behalf of a white party 
against a black party, but the opposing black party could not 
call a black witness to testify against the white party.29 Irre-
spective of their articulation, these rules “withdrew the sub-
stance of the protection of the laws in many cases and left only 
the shadow.”30 When people of color were deprived of the ability 
to testify, whites could abuse, rob, and kill them with near im-
punity.31 
Official race-based witness competency rules were eradi-
cated over 150 years ago.32 Today, evidence laws do not overtly 
name any race for favored or disfavored treatment. Traditional-
ists might argue that this means racism has been eliminated 
entirely from the rules of evidence and that we now have a ra-
cially unitary and unbiased evidence system.33 Viewed through 
colorblind optics, it appears that racial equality has been 
achieved in evidence law. However, applying CRT to the law of 
evidence reveals something different: a dual-race evidentiary 
system still exists in the United States. 
B. LOOKING FORWARD: CENTRAL PRECEPTS OF A CRITICAL RACE 
EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS 
It is challenging to define CRT succinctly because of the 
variety of perspectives and approaches taken by scholars. Part 
of its richness and insight stems from its diversity34 and inter-
 
 29. Id. at 474–75 (citing Burton v. Roe, 7 Del. (2 Houst.) 49 (1859)). 
 30. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). 
 31. See id. at 480–83; Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: 
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory 
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (1990) (“[W]hite people generally had 
automatic immunity against crimes committed.”). In the post-revolutionary 
south, “[s]tates rarely prosecuted whites for kidnapping and enslaving free Af-
rican-Americans because blacks were usually the only witnesses to the crime.” 
Id. at 21. 
 32. In 1864, Congress passed a law that provided, “in the courts of the 
United States there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color.” 
Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power To Enact Color-Conscious 
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 515 (1998) (quoting Act 
of July 2, 1864, ch. 210, § 3, 13 Stat. 351); see also George Fisher, The Jury’s 
Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 672, tbl.3 (1997) (providing a table of 
the first states to abolish these racial exclusion laws). 
 33. See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 21 
(2009) (quoting a traditionalist who believes that “[a]s long as the process is 
race-neutral . . . we can disregard disparate results with the confidence of 
knowing we have done the fair and just thing”). 
 34. Subgroups of CRT include Latino/a critical race theory, Asian Ameri-
can critical race theory, critical race feminism, and others. See, e.g., THE 
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nal debates.35 What unifies CRT more than a homogeneous 
viewpoint or methodology are its common questions and pur-
suits. CRT examines the foundations of our society—
particularly, our legal structure—and questions the bases of 
those foundations from a racial standpoint.36 In other words, as 
Dorothy Brown has summarized, “Critical Race Theory asks 
the question: ‘[W]hat does race have to do with it?’”37 
It is not feasible to summarize the entire field of CRT here, 
but it is helpful to discuss a few central tenets. In teaching, I 
refer to these as the “seven Ps of critical race inquiry”: the pow-
er behind racialization; the purpose of racism; privilege; the 
property of whiteness; the pervasiveness of racism; the perma-
nence of racism; and the perspectives of people of color. These 
concepts are interrelated and overlapping, but it is useful to 
consider how they apply to evidence law individually. The fol-
lowing will provide a guide for both the discussion in this Arti-
cle and future critical evidentiary scholarship. 
1. Power Behind Racialization 
At its core, CRT views the problem of racial differentiation 
and racism as linked inextricably to power.38 CRT posits that 
there are “insiders” and “outsiders” in American society and its 
legal systems.39 Insiders are white, generally male, heterosexu-
al, and relatively affluent.40 Outsiders are people of color, wom-
 
LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic 
eds., 1998). 
 35. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit To Dismantle 
That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283 (2000) (respectfully critiquing 
Derrick Bell’s emphasis on a binary model of racial progress that overlooks the 
experience of non-black people of color). 
 36. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 3 (2012). 
 37. DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 2014). 
 38. See BROOKS, supra note 33, at xviii. 
 39. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and Narrative in the So-
cial Construction of the Black Self, 40 HOW. L.J. 1, 34–35 (1996) (“[T]he ten-
sion between ‘insider’ white traditional, conservative and liberal males, and 
‘outsider’ people of color, who are currently engaged in what might amount to 
an intellectual life-and-death struggle for recognition within legal academe.” 
(citing Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How To Marginalize 
Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992))). 
 40. See Roy L. Brooks, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later: A 
Critical Race Theory Perspective, 47 HOW. L.J. 581, 582 (2004) (commenting 
that insiders “consist of White heterosexual males, especially cultural elites 
such as the captains of industry, congressional leaders, and Supreme Court 
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en, LGBT persons, and the poor.41 The more a person is an in-
sider, the more access to power he or she has. CRT argues that 
American society and its legal system are fundamentally slant-
ed, if not heavily skewed, in favor of insiders and structurally 
designed to keep insiders in power.42 Critical race theorists be-
lieve that racial differentiation and racism are less about racial 
partiality and more about maintaining existing power struc-
tures.43 
Evidence law is a particularly powerful mechanism in our 
legal system. It determines which facts will be considered to 
decide a person’s guilt or innocence in a criminal prosecution 
and one’s liability or immunity from responsibility in a civil ac-
tion. CRT invites us to start with the notion that the legal sys-
tem is slanted in favor of racial insiders. It then prompts us to 
examine evidence rules thoughtfully and to question rigorously 
whether they are applied to preserve existing racial power 
structures. 
2. The Purpose of Racism 
CRT posits that there is a distinct purpose behind both ra-
cial classifications and racism. Racial distinctions are not natu-
ral, biological, scientific, or fixed. Rather, race is a deliberate 
social construct.44 Humans share nearly all their genetics,45 as 
well as “higher-order traits” such as intelligence, reason, and 
morality.46 However, our society chooses to underplay our ex-
 
[J]ustices themselves” (citation omitted)). 
 41. See Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Con-
vergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2008) (discussing outsiders as people 
of color, women, and members of the LGBT community). 
 42. See Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil 
Rights in the New Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 59 (2002) 
(“The outsiders are those whose truths are disregarded, and the insiders are 
those whose stories fit within the ideological framework of ‘truth,’ which 
meant that outsiders had the right to question the legitimacy of the prevailing 
truth.”). 
 43. See BROOKS, supra note 33, at 91. 
 44. See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Obser-
vations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 
(1994) (“[H]uman interaction rather than natural differentiation must be seen 
as the source and continued basis for racial categorization.”). 
 45. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 20, at 13–14 (citing St. Francis Coll. v. 
Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987)); D.J. Witherspoon et al., Genetic 
Similarities Within and Between Human Populations, 176 GENETICS 351, 351 
(2007) (“[I]ndividuals from different populations can be genetically more simi-
lar than individuals from the same population.”). 
 46. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 36, at 8. 
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tensive similarities and focus on a few physical attributes—
such as hair texture, skin color, and facial features—to craft 
distinct races.47 Racial categorization then creates social struc-
tures and assigns moral qualities to members of racial groups 
in ways that benefit people designated to be “white.”48 Hence, 
the purpose of racial differentiation is to confer privilege upon 
the insider group—white people—juxtaposed with outsider 
groups: people of color.49 
If we recognize that race is a social construct and racism is 
not irrational but serves a purpose, we may be persuaded to 
reexamine the disparate impact evidence rules have on racial 
minorities. Instead of simply asking if the application of a rule 
intentionally discriminates against a person on the basis of 
race, we should consider the aggregate structural effects it has 
on a racial group. Often, disparate impact is considered unin-
tentional and therefore not warranting redress, but it is as det-
rimental as intentional discrimination.50 Racism and racial 
subordination can exist, even without discriminatory intent.51 
When we understand that the objective of racialization is to 
confer a collective benefit on whites, rather than simply to dis-
criminate against racial minorities because of race-based ani-
mus, we realize a dual concern about disparate treatment and 
disparate impact under evidence law. 
3. Privilege 
Since white privilege and superiority are the aims of rac-
ism, the current dichotomy of race discrimination is not oppres-
sor-versus-oppressed but privileged-versus-racially subordinat-
ed groups. The contemporary system of race and racism does 
not require intentional race-based discrimination or animus, 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1060, 1069 (1991). 
 49. See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1995) (“The concept of race has no natural 
truth, no core content or meaning other than those meanings created in a so-
cial system of white privilege and racist domination.”). 
 50. See DeLeith Duke Gossett, Take off the [Color] Blinders: How Ignoring 
the Hague Convention’s Subsidiarity Principle Furthers Structural Racism 
Against Black American Children, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 261, 274 (2015) 
(“[S]tructural racism exists despite intent, because a model of society that as-
sociates certain races with negative stereotypes will feed implicit biases that 
produce unconscious racism, even in the absence of blatantly racist actions.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 51. Id. 
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but instead centers on whites collectively receiving privileges 
and benefits from the systemic subordination of non-whites.52 
The racial predilections and motivations of individual white 
people are less important than the benefits that racial hierar-
chy confers upon whites en masse. 
Accordingly, in examining the law of evidence, we must 
ask: Who benefits? Even if a rule of evidence appears to apply 
uniformly to all persons, does a racial group disproportionately 
gain an evidentiary advantage under it? As this Article argues, 
in many instances whites profit while people of color are dis-
proportionately disfavored under the application of evidence 
law. 
Concomitant with white privilege is white normativity and 
transparency. White normativity is the implicit belief that 
white ideas, practices, and experiences are inherently normal, 
natural, and right.53 White transparency is “the tendency of 
whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, 
experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific.”54 White 
transparency occurs when “the white point of view masquer-
ades as colorless, raceless, and systematically devoid of bias.”55 
The imposition of white norms is a form of implicit bias which 
differs from traditional discrimination law’s fixation with race-
based animosity and impetus.56 White normativity and trans-
parency inflict as much damage as overt discrimination and are 
even more pervasive and difficult to remedy under our current 
jurisprudence. 
Thus, in examining evidence law, CRT prompts us to ask 
not only who benefits but how white norms and white trans-
parency play a role in admissibility determinations. White 
transparency is so entrenched in our society and legal systems 
 
 52. See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Fu-
ture of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1023–24 (1989) 
(discussing the system of racial subordination and white supremacy and how 
this system has persisted). 
 53. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX 
OF RACE 6 (1997). 
 54. Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind but Now I See”: White Race Conscious-
ness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 
(1993); see also Bonnie Kae Grover, Growing up White in America?, in CRITI-
CAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 34, 34 (Richard Delgado 
& Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). 
 55. Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Re-
ply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 872 (1998). 
 56. See Flagg, supra note 54, at 959. 
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that evidence of white norms, customs, or experiences are often 
submitted to the jury without opposing counsel’s objection or 
judicial scrutiny because they are considered universal, not ra-
cially or culturally distinct. One evidence context where this is 
implicated—discussed in detail below—is the relevance and 
probative value of a defendant of color’s flight from the police.57 
White experience assumes that running from the police indi-
cates consciousness of guilt of a crime, but people of color often 
flee from law enforcement due to fear of racially targeted profil-
ing or violence.58 
The rules of evidence often call on fact-finders to employ 
“common sense psychology” or otherwise determine what a rea-
sonable person would do in a given circumstance.59 These situa-
tions are ripe for white transparency problems because people 
of color are underrepresented while whites are overrepresent-
ed—in proportion to their populations—on juries and the 
bench.60 
Another example is when minority silence is deemed an 
adoptive admission. Out-of-court statements offered for their 
truth are generally considered hearsay and deemed inadmissi-
ble.61 However, an opposing party’s statements are not consid-
ered hearsay.62 Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) 
(and similar state evidence rules) allows “adoptive admissions” 
against a party opponent.63 This hearsay exemption allows a 
statement to be offered against an opposing party if that party 
adopted it as his or her own. A party may adopt a statement 
through verbal or nonverbal conduct, or even silence. “When si-
lence is relied upon, the theory is that the person would, under 
 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. See Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (2016). 
 59. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Adoptive Admissions and the Meaning of Si-
lence: Continuing the Inquiry into Evidence Law and Issues of Race, Class, 
Gender, and Ethnicity, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 337, 337–38 (1999). 
 60. According to two 2009 studies, seventy percent of the federal judiciary 
are white men, eight percent of the federal judiciary are black, and five per-
cent are Hispanic; only 11.6% of state court judges are minorities. RUSSELL 
WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST., THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICI-
ARY 1 (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/08_ 
federal_judiciary_wheeler.pdf; Malia Reddick et al., Racial and Gender Diver-
sity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 JUDGES’ J. 28, 31 (2009). 
 61. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 62. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).  
 63. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (“A statement . . . is not hearsay . . . [if ] of-
fered against an opposing party and . . . is one the party manifested that it 
adopted or believed to be true.”). 
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the circumstances, protest the statement made in his [or her] 
presence, if untrue.”64 Thus, trial judges are asked to determine 
whether a person would have objected to the statement if it 
were untrue under the circumstances presented. When a party 
is a racial, ethnic, or cultural minority, a majority judge might 
apply white norms of conduct and communication and find that 
the statement called for the party to have protested.65 However, 
under the minority party’s own cultural norms, silence may 
have been entirely appropriate in the situation and not indica-
tive of adoption even if the statement was untrue.66 As Maria 
Ontiveros has discussed, silence in Latino/a, Asian American, 
and African American, as well as other minority communities, 
does not necessarily indicate assent or tacit agreement.67 This 
is just one example of the negative impact white transparency 
and normativity can have on people of color in the evidentiary 
sphere. Since the rules of evidence impart vast discretion to the 
trial judge, white transparency and normativity problems 
abound in evidentiary determinations. 
4. The Property of Whiteness 
Whiteness is not merely a racial designation; it is a form of 
property.68 As Cheryl Harris established in her seminal article, 
“Whiteness as Property,” “The law’s construction of whiteness 
defined and affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); 
of privilege (what benefits accrue to that status); and, of prop-
erty (what legal entitlements arise from that status).”69 Proper-
ty is not merely a tangible thing but a right or expectation of 
rights. Harris provides an extensive framework of whiteness as 
a traditional and modern form of property, which includes the 
conception of reputation as property.70 
 
 64. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note on proposed 
rules. 
 65. See Ontiveros, supra note 59, at 343–50 (discussing Latino/a, Asian 
American, and African American cultural reasons for silence and cases in 
which white norms of communication prevailed in court). 
 66. Id. (discussing aspects of Latino/a, Asian American, and African 
American communication which indicate silence is not agreement with or 
adoption of a statement). 
 67. Id.; Bret Ruber, Note, Adoptive Admissions and the Duty To Speak: A 
Proposal for an Appropriate Test for the Admissibility of Silence in the Face of 
an Accusation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 312 (2014). 
 68. See generally Harris, supra note 9. 
 69. Id. at 1725. 
 70. Id. at 1725–36. 
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In the evidence context, reputation is central to witness 
credibility and character determinations. On the witness stand, 
as Montré Carodine has elucidated, “race itself is evidence—
character evidence—and it has a real impact” on trial out-
comes.71 The vestiges of race-based witness competency rules 
which were based on a “general distrust of the veracity of 
blacks” and other people of color persist today.72 As this Article 
explores, in the context of stand-your-ground defenses and 
cross-racial misidentifications, jurors tend to find white wit-
nesses more credible and convincing than non-white witness-
es.73 This is true even where their testimony is far-fetched or 
suggests unreliability; the witness’s whiteness serves as racial 
character evidence of truthfulness.74 
5. The Pervasiveness of Racism 
CRT examines the pervasiveness and centrality of racism 
and white hegemony in our institutions and everyday life. The 
pervasive “ordinariness” of racism is perhaps the most central 
principle of CRT, as all the other tenets build upon this con-
cept.75 Ordinariness means racism is the norm in America, not 
the exception.76 As Richard Delgado reflected, “[R]acism is as 
inherent in Americans as DNA.”77 People of color face racism 
regularly as a part of their everyday life.78 Concurrently, white 
people experience racial privilege as the standard each and 
every day.79 Because racism is ordinary, it often goes 
unacknowledged by the majority unless manifested in its most 
egregious forms.80 This makes most racism exceedingly difficult 
to address and remedy.81 Until we recognize the pervasiveness 
 
 71. See Carodine, supra note 10; Montré D. Carodine, Race Is Evidence: 
(Mis)Characterizing Blackness in the American Civil Rights Story, in CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 64, 64–67 (Austin Sarat 
ed., 2014); see also Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Introduction to Challenging Au-
thority: A Symposium Honoring Derrick Bell, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 429, 431 
(2014). 
 72. Cf. Capers, supra note 24, at 1378. 
 73. See infra Part II.C. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 36, at 7. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Richard Delgado & Daniel A. Farber, Is American Law Inherently 
Racist?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 361, 373 (1998). 
 78. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 36, at 7. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 7. 
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of racism, we cannot delve beyond the surface of evidence law’s 
race-neutral language to root out institutional racism. 
6. The Permanence of Racism 
Perhaps even more troubling than the pervasiveness of 
racism is its permanence. As Derrick Bell observed, “[R]acism 
is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this 
society.”82 Bell contended that while the exterior expressions of 
racism might change, white society will never relinquish its in-
vestment in deep-seated racism and its attendant white privi-
leges and benefits.83 Bell pointed to civil rights “victories,”84 like 
Brown v. Board of Education,85 and asserted that they do not 
indicate improvements in race relations.86 Rather, he posited 
that African Americans remain disadvantaged “unless whites 
perceive that nondiscriminatory treatment for [blacks] will be a 
benefit for them[selves].”87 Under this theory of interest conver-
gence, Brown was less about racial justice and more about the 
United States fostering an international reputation consistent 
with the democratic values it touted during the Cold-War era.88 
This explains why the civil rights movement came about and 
why it ended a decade later.89 
Bell’s permanence-of-racism hypothesis continues to ap-
pear true today. After Barack Obama, the nation’s first African 
American president, was elected many thought that we were 
living in a post-racial era where racism had been all but eradi-
 
 82. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMA-
NENCE OF RACISM, at ix (1992) [hereinafter BELL, BOTTOM OF THE WELL]; see 
also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 78 (2004); Derrick Bell, Racial 
Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 377–78 (1992). 
 83. See BELL, BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 82, at 4–8. 
 84. Id. at 21. 
 85. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial 
segregation in public education is unconstitutional); BELL, BOTTOM OF THE 
WELL, supra note 82, at 24–25. 
 86. BELL, BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 82, at 15–31. 
 87. Id. at 7; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and 
the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The in-
terest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it 
converges with the interests of whites.”). 
 88. See Bell, supra note 87, at 524. 
 89. Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American 
Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 369, 371–77 (2002). 
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cated.90 However, the 2016 presidential election and aftermath 
have showed us that wide-spread racism persists in the United 
States. For instance, Donald Trump’s campaign centered on 
racist and xenophobic appeal, such as calling Mexican immi-
grants criminals and rapists, promising the erection of a wall 
along the U.S.-Mexico border, and barring all Muslims from en-
tering into the country.91 The Ku Klux Klan and other white 
supremacist and nationalist groups enthusiastically cam-
paigned for and celebrated the election of Trump.92 Unprece-
dented numbers of racially motivated hate crimes, harassment, 
and bullying erupted after Trump’s election.93 Although racism 
can superficially seem dormant, it is ever present and in need 
of remediation. 
If we acknowledge the permanence of racism in our society 
and legal structure, signs of racial subordination in the evi-
dence context will come more clearly into view and can be ad-
dressed. Although currently under-utilized, evidence rules 
could be employed to combat systemic racism. For instance, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (and its state equivalents) pro-
vides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . un-
fair prejudice.”94 Often the racial prejudice posed by an item of 
evidence goes unnoticed. Consequently, opposing counsel does 
not make a Rule 403 objection even when the danger of racial 
prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative val-
ue. As advocated below,95 under Rule 403 the term “prejudice” 
should include racial prejudice. CRT provides analytical tools to 
reveal such prejudice so that it can be recognized properly and 
objected to by counsel, weighed by the trial judge, and the evi-
dence possibly rejected. 
 
 90. See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and 
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010). 
 91. From the First African-American President to One Supported by the 
Ku Klux Klan: Trump Wins in Upset, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Nov. 9, 2016), https:// 
www.democracynow.org/2016/11/9/from_the_first_african_american_president. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Month Following the Elec-
tion, SPLC (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/ 
update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-following-election. 
 94. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 95. See infra Part III.B. 
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7. Perspectives of People of Color 
To combat the traditionalist contention that we live in a 
post-racial society where racism no longer exists, CRT invites 
and values the perspectives of people of color. The voice-of-color 
thesis holds that “[m]inority status” and experience bring with 
them “a presumed competence to speak about race and rac-
ism.”96 The legal storytelling and counter-storytelling move-
ment arose out of the voice-of-color thesis. It asks people of col-
or to speak about their experiences with racism in the legal 
system and “apply their own unique perspectives to assess 
law’s master narratives.”97 Because our life experiences differ 
by where we fall in the system’s racial hierarchy, it is crucial to 
create space for and listen to those who traditionally have not 
had a voice in the legal system. Doing so enables us to better 
assess the extent of and remedies for racial bias.98 
In the evidence context, the ability of people of color to 
have a voice and share their experiences of systemic racism 
should be of particular concern. As the Hall court observed, al-
beit to support a discriminatory outcome, the ability of people 
of color to testify in the courtroom is fundamentally linked to 
their ability to be full citizens.99 A central objective of this Arti-
cle is to explore the ways evidence law silences minority narra-
tives in the courtroom while reinforcing majority experiences 
and perspectives. Historical race-based witness competency 
rules created a dual-race system where people of color were un-
able to give evidence on par with whites. The critical race anal-
ysis of evidence law and practice that follows demonstrates that 
we still operate under a dual evidentiary structure in many re-
spects. 
C. THE FUNCTION OF A CRITICAL RACE EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS 
The function of a critical race evidentiary analysis is two-
fold. First, application of CRT to evidentiary issues brings to 
light overlooked racial inequalities under evidence law. Second, 
an evidentiary analysis of these racial inequalities reveals ra-
cial disparities in the parties’ relative ability to enter or pre-
vent the admission of evidence. Thus, a critical race evidentiary 
 
 96. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 36, at 9. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race The-
ory, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 511–12 (1997). 
 99. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854). 
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inquiry does not stop with the application of CRT principles to 
evidentiary matters. It also applies an evidence analysis to the 
racial justice problem itself. It explores how conventional 
treatment of evidentiary issues poses both racial justice and ev-
idence concerns. This often exposes how evidence that supports 
white privilege and dominance or reflects white norms is treat-
ed more favorably than evidence which is probative of structur-
al racism or reflects minority perspectives. The rules of evi-
dence themselves might not have been crafted with a racially 
discriminatory purpose or otherwise be inherently discrimina-
tory, but their unequal or incomplete application produces a ra-
cially subordinating effect. 
To make this framework more concrete, an example might 
be helpful. One example, which will be discussed in more detail 
directly below, is witness credibility. A CRT analysis demon-
strates that due to implicit racial bias white witnesses are gen-
erally perceived to be more credible than witnesses of color.100 
Although not officially entered into evidence, jurors consider a 
witness’s whiteness as de facto evidence of the witness’s char-
acter for truthfulness. In an instant, at first sight and without 
formally entering evidence or investing resources, the party 
calling the white witness has been able to bolster the witness’s 
credibility for truthfulness. Conversely, a witness of color is au-
tomatically considered less credible, and to bolster the witness 
of color’s character of truthfulness the party must navigate rig-
orous evidence rules. 
Discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 608, which governs 
when a witness’s credibility for truthfulness may be supported 
by character evidence, illustrates some of the disparate bur-
dens and barriers that a witness of color faces under evidence 
law. These barriers and burdens are particularly onerous when 
the witness of color is the criminal defendant or is called by the 
criminal defendant. A critical race evidentiary analysis reveals 
how the use of whiteness as character evidence is improper be-
cause it is based on racial preferences and because it runs afoul 
of evidence rules. Under Rule 608, evidence of the truthful 
character of a witness is admissible only after that witness’s 
 
 100. See generally Amanda Carlin, The Courtroom as White Space: Racial 
Performance as Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450, 471, 477–84 (2016) (con-
ducting a case study of the George Zimmerman trial and noting that jurors’ 
credibility determinations are more negative when minority witnesses do not 
“perform whiteness”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the 
Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996). 
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character for truthfulness has been attacked.101 While a white 
witness automatically has their credibility bolstered, a witness 
of color is precluded from doing so unless their character is 
formally attacked and then must invest resources to secure and 
introduce a character witness. 
Critical race evidentiary analysis attempts to expose how 
the evidentiary playing field is not level. Recognition that the 
evidentiary deck is stacked against people of color in a multi-
tude of inconspicuous ways could be an important first step to 
prompt mitigation of implicit and structural racial bias at trial. 
II.  A CRITICAL RACE ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE LAW   
In applying CRT to evidence law, we must answer a two-
part “subordination question”: “(1) whether a rule of law or le-
gal doctrine, practice, or custom [of evidence] subordinates im-
portant interests and concerns of racial minorities and (2) if so, 
how is this problem best remedied?”102 Derrick Bell’s theories of 
the pervasiveness and permanence of racism prompt us to be 
inquisitive. Even if a rule of evidence appears race-neutral on 
its face or in its application, we scrutinize it. CRT asserts that 
our justice system serves to protect and preserve existing power 
structures that ensure “insiders” remain in power and benefit 
from the subordination of “outsiders.” We can test this hypoth-
esis in the realm of evidence by asking: Are racial “insiders,” 
such as whites, privileged under our evidentiary system? Spe-
cifically, does our system favor evidence proffered by whites or 
evidence infused with racism—both of which ultimately benefit 
white people as a group? Does it disfavor evidence introduced 
by people of color or evidence that attempts to bring embedded 
racism to light? 
Though there are many topics ripe for critical evidentiary 
inquiry, this Article analyzes three of today’s most pressing jus-
tice issues: stand-your-ground defenses, flight from racially 
targeted police profiling and violence, and cross-racial eyewit-
ness (mis)identifications. Each analysis demonstrates compo-
nents of the contemporary dual-race evidentiary system. The 
examination of stand-your-ground defenses gives an example of 
how parties, witnesses, and victims of color do not start off on 
equal evidentiary footing because race itself is used as charac-
 
 101. FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
 102. Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Appli-
cation to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 88 (1994). 
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ter “evidence” to the detriment of people of color and the benefit 
of whites. The exploration of flight and cross-racial eyewitness 
identifications illustrates how evidence of people of color’s ex-
periences of systemic racism are disproportionately excluded. 
Consistent with the fact that racial benefit is the contemporary 
corollary of racial subordination, each analysis reveals how evi-
dence of white norms and evidence redolent of white superiori-
ty and racism receive favorable evidentiary treatment. The dis-
cussion touches on the major subjects of evidence law, including 
relevance, prejudice, hearsay, and character evidence. These 
examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. It is my hope that 
these examples will spark further critical race inquiry into how 
evidence law subordinates marginalized groups and how it can 
be improved to achieve greater justice. 
A. STAND-YOUR-GROUND DEFENSES AND RACIAL CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE 
“I filed a pre-trial motion to keep [the issue of race] out be-
cause we don’t want to taint that jury.”103 
Michael Dunn, a middle-aged white man, fired ten bullets 
into a car of unarmed black teenagers—killing seventeen-year-
old Jordan Davis—after a heated verbal exchange about the 
volume of rap music playing on their car stereo.104 During 
Dunn’s trial for murder and attempted murder, Dunn’s defense 
counsel claimed that he tried to keep evidence of race from be-
ing presented at trial and that the defense never brought race 
into the case.105 However, Dunn’s defense rested heavily on 
race, specifically race as a proxy for character. In Dunn’s first 
trial, the jury found him guilty of attempted murder of the 
three surviving teens but deadlocked on the first-degree mur-
der charge for killing Davis, despite overwhelming evidence of 
 
 103. Dan Scanian, Michael Dunn’s Defense Attorney Takes Long List of Re-
porters’ Questions; Here Are His Answers, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-02-13/story/michael-dunns-defense 
-attorney-takes-long-list-reporters-questions-here. The defense counsel’s ef-
forts “to keep [race] out” of the trial included “never identif[ying] a single wit-
ness by either the color of their skin or their gender.” Id. 
 104. See Lizette Alvarez, Florida Man’s Fiancée Contradicts Parts of His 
Testimony in Killing of Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/florida-mans-fiancee-contradicts-parts-of-his 
-testimony-in-killing-of-teenager.html?_r=1; Scanian, supra note 103. 
 105. See Alvarez, supra note 104; Scanian, supra note 103.  
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his guilt.106 Speaking to the press after the trial, two jurors 
stated that race was never discussed or considered by the ju-
ry.107 Race may not have been discussed explicitly during jury 
deliberations, but it certainly was considered.108 
As Montré Carodine’s scholarship has demonstrated, 
“[r]ace is evidence,” and more specifically, “race is one form of 
character evidence.”109 Historically, blackness was prima facie 
evidence of being a slave,110 and it could even be used to prove 
intent in a rape prosecution if the victim was white.111 In to-
day’s criminal justice system, blackness and brownness are fre-
quently de facto “evidence” of bad character, while whiteness is 
de facto “evidence” of good character.112 In this Article, I refer to 
this phenomenon as “racial character evidence.” The term is 
partly accurate and partly a misnomer. Racial character evi-
dence is evidence in the sense that juries often rely upon it in 
reaching a verdict. However, it is not technically evidence be-
cause it is usually not formally introduced or subjected to evi-
dentiary scrutiny. In other words, it is not admissible legal 
proof. Fact-finders simply perceive the race of a defendant, vic-
tim, or other witness and conclude that he or she is truthful or 
untruthful, peaceful or violent, reckless or prudent. Attorneys 
 
 106. See Michael Muskal, Michael Dunn Convicted on 4 of 5 Charges in 
Loud-Music Murder Case, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-michael-dunn-loud-music-verdict-20140213-story 
.html#ixzz2uItCJPW5. 
 107. Alina Machado et al., Juror in Michael Dunn Trial: ‘Race Was Never a 
Factor,’ CNN (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/20/justice/florida 
-loud-music-case; Seni Tienabeso, Juror in ‘Loud Music’ Trial Wanted Murder 
Conviction, ABC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/juror-loud 
-music-trial-wanted-murder-conviction/story?id=22571068. 
 108. See, e.g., Ahmad Abuznaid et al., “Stand Your Ground” Laws: Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Implications, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1129, 1145 (2014) 
(“The racist overtones and undertones of the Davis case are undeniable.”); Re-
bekah Skiba, Returning to the Roots of the Castle Doctrine: Why Recent Stand 
Your Ground Laws Are in Line with the Natural Law, 10 S.J. POL’Y & JUST. 
71, 86 (2016) (arguing that the jury’s failure to find Dunn guilty of murder is 
evidence of an FBI report revealing “potential justification for society’s posi-
tion that Stand Your Ground laws are misapplied due to racial bias”); 
Carodine, supra note 10, at 691 (stating, “I do not think that anyone would se-
riously argue that Michael Dunn would have shot Jordan Davis if Davis had 
been white,” during discussions of race as character evidence). 
 109. Carodine, supra note 71, at 66–67. 
 110. Haney López, supra note 44, at 1–4 (discussing Hudgins v. Wright, 11 
Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (Va. 1806)). 
 111. Carodine, supra note 10, at 680–81. 
 112. See Carodine, supra note 71, at 70. 
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do not introduce racial character evidence officially through 
traditional avenues, but many know it plays a determinative 
role and craftily encourage its use.113 
Occasionally, the implicit reasoning behind racial charac-
ter evidence is made explicit. For instance, in United States v. 
Calhoun a federal prosecutor asked on cross-examination: 
“You’ve got African-Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got 
a bag full of money. Doesn’t that tell you—a lightbulb doesn’t 
go off in your head and say, this is a drug deal?”114 The prosecu-
tor’s reasoning here was plainly that African Americans and 
Latinos have a character propensity to engage in illegal drug 
trafficking and that this propensity is commonly understood.115 
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor (joined by Justice Stephen Breyer) 
observed, this kind of racial character evidence is unacceptable: 
“[It] diminishes the dignity of our criminal justice system and 
undermines respect for the rule of law. We expect the Govern-
ment to seek justice, not to fan the flames of fear and preju-
dice.”116 
Not only is racial character evidence contrary to justice and 
fairness, it violates evidence law. However, racial character ev-
idence is rarely, if ever, addressed under evidence law. A per-
son’s race, itself, is not relevant to prove guilt, liability, or wit-
ness credibility, and thus should not be considered by a fact-
finder for that purpose. However, jurors too often consider a de-
fendant’s race as evidence for these impermissible purposes. 
For instance, during jury deliberations in Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado—a trial of a man charged with sexual assault and 
harassment—a juror stated, “I think [Defendant] did it because 
he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want,” and 
in the juror’s experience as a former law enforcement officer, 
“Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they 
 
 113. See id. at 81. 
 114. Calhoun v. United States, Nos. SA-14-CA-155, SA-08-CR-351, 2014 
WL 2723188, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2014). 
 115. One study from 2000 reported that white adolescents between the ag-
es of twelve and seventeen are more than one-third more likely to have sold 
illegal drugs than black youths. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 
99 (2012) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON 
DRUG ABUSE, 1999 71, tbl.G (2000)). 
 116. Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1138 (2013) (denying peti-
tion for writ of certiorari); see Carodine, supra note 10, at 689 (discussing Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s decision to write an opinion accompanying the denial of certi-
orari). 
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could do whatever they wanted with women.”117 Thus, the juror 
used the defendant’s race as a proxy for character: since the de-
fendant is Mexican, he was more likely to have committed the 
offenses charged. The juror also stated that he did not believe 
the defendant’s alibi witness, who was Hispanic, was credible 
because he was “an illegal.”118 Here, the juror concluded that 
the alibi witness (a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States) was not credible because he was Hispanic.119 Race itself 
was considered proof of defendant’s guilt and his alibi witness’s 
truthfulness. 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant 
only if “it has any tendency to make a fact [of consequence] 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”120 
That someone is of a particular race, by itself,121 does not make 
it more or less likely that they committed a crime or tort or that 
they will be truthful or untruthful on the witness stand. Cer-
tain racial groups are not more prone to engage in illegal, reck-
less, or untruthful behavior than others. Racial character evi-
dence is, therefore, irrelevant and inadmissible.122 
Racial character evidence is impermissible under other ev-
idence rules as well. Admissibility determinations focus on the 
purpose for which an item of evidence is utilized. In the case of 
racial character evidence, race is used as a stand-in trait for 
good or bad character. Racial prejudice and groundless stereo-
types persuade jurors to believe that people of color have a 
character propensity to engage in violent or illicit activity or to 
lie. Racial preferences convince jurors that white persons are 
peaceful, law-abiding, and honest. Whether relied upon for pos-
itive or negative traits, character propensity evidence is gener-
ally prohibited under evidence rules.123 
Specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) (and similar 
state rules) provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or 
 
 117. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 350 P.3d 287, 289 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 
S.Ct. 855 (2017). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. FED. R. EVID. 401(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 401(b). 
 121. There are some limited instances where race might be relevant. For 
example, if the perpetrator’s identity is at issue and an eyewitness’s descrip-
tion of the perpetrator included race, evidence of a defendant’s race might be 
relevant to show that he or she matched the description of the suspect in that 
respect. 
 122. FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). 
 123. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
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character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or 
trait.”124 Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, 
or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”125 This means that evidence of a 
defendant’s or victim’s character or prior bad acts cannot be 
used to prove that he or she committed a crime or was violent. 
Similarly, if not more emphatically, a defendant’s or victim’s 
racial traits should not be relied upon to determine that he or 
she is inclined to criminality or violence. Likewise, a witness’s 
race should not be the basis to conclude that he or she is truth-
ful or untruthful. And a victim’s race should never be consid-
ered in determining whether he or she was the first aggressor 
or nonviolent. 
Though racial character evidence is inadmissible, it is often 
considered by juries and can be outcome determinative in crim-
inal cases.126 This is particularly evident in “stand-your-
ground”127 cases where defendants charged with murder assert 
self-defense. The Dunn case is a prime example.128 The evidence 
against Dunn was significant. Aside from Dunn’s own testimo-
ny that the victim Jordan Davis stood and pointed a rifle barrel 
at him, there was no evidence that Davis or his friends had 
firearms. The three other teenagers in the vehicle testified that 
they were not carrying weapons, and the police did not find 
firearms at the scene.129 The medical examiner who performed 
 
 124. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
 125. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 126. See, e.g., Carodine, supra note 10, at 688–90 (describing one juror’s 
negative perception of a black witness in the Trayvon Martin murder trial). 
 127. As of 2014, thirty-three states had “stand-your-ground” laws by either 
statute or judicial decision. AM. BAR ASSOC. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON STAND 
YOUR GROUND LAWS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/diversity/SYG_Report_ 
Book.pdf. 
 128. In this case, Dunn did not claim “stand-your-ground” immunity; he 
relied on a claim of self-defense. In Florida, self-defense encapsulates the right 
to stand your ground, to not retreat, and to use deadly force if you reasonably 
believe it is necessary to prevent death or severe bodily harm. See infra note 
135. The jury instruction in the first trial included the following: “The danger 
facing M[ichael] D[unn] need not have been actual . . . the appearance of dan-
ger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person un-
der the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be 
avoided only through the use of [deadly] force.” Jury Instructions at 27, State 
v. Dunn, No. 162012CF011572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 2014), 2014 WL 655357. 
 129. Pia Malbran & Noreen O’Donnell, Michael Dunn, in Just Released 
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Davis’s autopsy testified “that it was ‘unlikely’ . . . Davis was 
standing when he was shot”; his wounds indicated that he was 
seated and leaning away from the shooter.130 Dunn fired several 
bullets at the teens’ vehicle and drove away with his fiancé.131 
After the shooting, Dunn and his fiancé spent the rest of the 
day and night in a hotel room, ordered pizza, and drove to their 
home a few hours away the next day.132 At trial, Dunn’s fiancé 
testified that despite the many hours Dunn spent alone with 
her after the shooting and before his arrest, Dunn never once 
claimed that Davis had been armed.133 
Despite abundant evidence against Dunn, and although 
the jury found him guilty on three counts of attempted second-
degree murder of the other teenagers, the jury deadlocked on 
the charge of the first-degree murder of Davis.134 As the jury 
was instructed, under Florida’s stand-your-ground law, Dunn 
was entitled to use deadly force against a perceived deadly 
threat without first attempting to retreat.135 However, aside 
from Dunn’s self-serving testimony, the only possible “evidence” 
that Davis threatened Dunn with a gun was that Davis was a 
young black male. The character presumption about black men 
and boys in our society is that they are dangerous, violent, and 
menacing.136 Thus, the jury in the first trial determined that it 
 
Phone Calls, Describes Himself as Victim After Killing Teenager, CBS NEWS 
(Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-dunn-described-himself 
-as-victim-victor-after-killing-teenager-in-argument-over-music. 
 130. Alvarez, supra note 104. 
 131. Initial Brief of Appellant at 12–13, Dunn v. State, No. 1D14-4924 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2015). 
 132. Id. at 18, 21. 
 133. Muskal, supra note 106. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014) (“A person is justified in using or 
threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or 
threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great 
bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent com-
mission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force 
in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the 
right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the 
deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or 
she has a right to be.”). 
 136. See Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Col-
or-Conscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 
1560 (2012) (describing a study in which police officers were read a fact pat-
tern of a shoplifting or assault crime committed by a hypothetical adolescent 
whose race is not specified; officers exposed to words associated with black 
people judged the adolescent as being “more hostile, more adult-like and 
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was legitimate for a forty-five-year-old white male to feel of-
fended by the volume of hip hop music emanating from the 
black teenagers’ vehicle and personally threatened by a seven-
teen-year-old black male. The racial character evidence of the 
three surviving black teenagers who testified was that they 
were not to be believed, while the racial character evidence of 
the white defendant was that he was truthful. 
The use of character evidence to prove a witness’s good 
character for truthfulness is specifically prohibited by evidence 
rules. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides that “evidence 
of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s 
character for truthfulness has been attacked.”137 If a witness’s 
veracity is not challenged, evidence bolstering his or her credi-
bility is inadmissible.138 Dunn’s credibility should not have been 
bolstered because it was never attacked. There should not be a 
racial exception to Rule 608(a) for whiteness. Though Dunn 
was eventually convicted of the first-degree murder of Jordan 
Davis in a second trial,139 the first trial illustrates how armed-
white-on-unarmed-black killings are often perceived in our so-
ciety and brings to light the role of racial character evidence in 
stand-your-ground defense cases. 
The Dunn case is not an anomaly. The scenario with the 
highest probability of being found a “justified” homicide, mean-
ing a killing in self-defense, is when a white shooter kills a 
black victim.140 In states that do not have a stand-your-ground 
law, a white person is 250% more likely to be deemed justified 
in killing a black person than killing another white person.141 
States with stand-your-ground laws reveal an even starker dis-
parity. In these states, a white person is 354% more likely to be 
 
blameworthy, more likely to possess internal criminal motivation, and more 
likely to recidivate”). 
 137. FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
 138. Id.; JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 47, at 72 
(5th ed. 1999) (“[A]bsent an attack upon credibility, no bolstering evidence is 
allowed.”). 
 139. Elisha Fieldstadt, Michael Dunn Sentenced to Life Without Parole for 
Loud Music Killing, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/michael-dunn-sentenced-life-without-parole-loud-music-killing 
-n228191. 
 140. See John Roman & P. Mitchell Downey, Stand Your Ground Laws and 
Miscarriages of Justice, URBAN INST. (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.urban.org/ 
urban-wire/stand-your-ground-laws-and-miscarriages-justice. 
 141. Sarah Childress, Is There Racial Bias in “Stand Your Ground” Laws?, 
PBS (July 31, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-there-racial 
-bias-in-stand-your-ground-laws. 
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deemed justified in killing a black person than killing a white 
person.142 In a study focused specifically on Florida’s stand-
your-ground law, the data showed that defendants were twice 
as likely to be convicted if the victim was white instead of a 
person of color.143 According to psychologists, research indicates 
that racial bias influences beliefs about who is considered a 
threat.144 States with stand-your-ground laws offer formidable 
protections for individuals, particularly whites, who act violent-
ly when faced with perceived threats. 
Despite Dunn’s defense counsel’s professed attempt to keep 
race out of the case and the jurors’ claim that race was never 
discussed in their deliberations, the outcome of the first trial 
cries out for a conclusion that racial character evidence played 
a key role. As the stand-your-ground statistics indicate, a vic-
tim’s blackness is evidence itself that the victim was dangerous 
and that deadly force was justified against him or her. When 
the defendant asserting a stand-your-ground defense is white, 
race is character evidence that he or she was justified in attack-
ing the victim. When jurors see a black witness, they may per-
ceive race as a form of character evidence that the witness is 
not credible. In contrast, a jury may characterize white wit-
nesses as more credible simply by virtue of their whiteness. 
This puts the prosecution in the position of having to not 
only prove the white defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but to prove the victim of color’s peacefulness: that the 
victim of color did not deserve to die. The latter cannot be es-
tablished merely by the facts of the case (such as showing that 
the victim was unarmed and did not threaten or assault the de-
fendant). The prosecution must also introduce sufficient evi-
dence to overcome racial stereotypes about how black and 
brown people are inherently dangerous and threatening. This is 
an example of how evidentiary burdens are not equal on racial 
lines. 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Nicole Ackermann et al., Race, Law, and Health: Examination of 
‘Stand Your Ground’ and Defendant Convictions in Florida, 142 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 194, 199 (2015). 
 144. See Rebecca Voelker, Psychologists Laud ABA’s Move To Oppose Stand 
Your Ground Laws, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., May 2015, at 13. 
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B. FLIGHT AND RACIALIZED REALITY EVIDENCE 
1. Doctrine of Flight 
It is a common scene in movies and evidence law case-
books145: A burglar alarm sounds or shots ring out. A police of-
ficer sees a man near the scene. The man takes one look at the 
officer and runs. At trial, the prosecutor introduces evidence of 
the man’s flight to prove his guilt for the burglary or shooting. 
The government’s reasoning that evidence of the man’s flight is 
relevant is as old as the Bible: “The wicked flee when no man 
pursueth.”146 
At first glance, the argument supporting the admission of 
flight evidence appears simple: only the guilty run. The defend-
ant ran from the police or scene, so the prosecution offers his 
flight as circumstantial evidence of his guilt. A closer look, 
however, reveals that flight is often a complex evidentiary is-
sue. Where people of color flee from police, a critical race in-
quiry reveals structural racial bias entrenched in the eviden-
tiary doctrine of flight. “Black or brown flight” from police is 
frequently a product of systemic racism. People of color, partic-
ularly men, often avoid interaction with police officers because 
they fear being racially profiled, brutalized, or even killed. 
However, defendants of color face significant evidentiary barri-
ers to introducing evidence of the systemic racism that moti-
vated their flight and would demonstrate that their retreat 
does not indicate guilt. 
Courts have determined that many kinds of conduct consti-
tute flight from a law enforcement officer, like walking away 
from an officer or pulling away when an officer puts his or her 
hand on one’s shoulder.147 The probative value of flight “as cir-
cumstantial evidence of guilt depends upon the degree of confi-
dence [that] four inferences can be drawn: ‘(1) from the defend-
 
 145. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 63–65 (3d ed. 2013) (presenting 
multiple fact pattern problems involving people running from the scene of a 
crime). 
 146. Proverbs 28:1 (King James); see California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 
623 n.1 (1991); Charles L. Hobson, Flight and Terry: Providing the Necessary 
Bright Line, 3 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 119, 123 (1992). 
 147. See, e.g., Trusty v. State, 508 A.2d 1018, 1019–20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1986) (considering a case where an officer placed his hand on the suspect’s 
arm, and the suspect subsequently pulled away), aff ’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 521 A.2d 749 (Md. 1987); People v. Howard, 408 N.E.2d 908, 911 (N.Y. 
1980) (considering a case where a suspect changed directions and quickened 
pace when confronted with an officer). 
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ant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; 
(3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concern-
ing the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt con-
cerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime 
charged.’”148 
This chain of inferences can be broken at any of the four 
steps. At the first step, the defendant’s conduct might not have 
actually been flight at all. For instance, the defendant might 
have just been jogging at the wrong place at the wrong time. 
Under step two—inferring flight to indicate consciousness of 
guilt—a person may indeed flee from police but for innocent 
reasons. The defendant may have been afraid of being falsely 
accused or asked to be a witness, or he or she may want to 
avoid a dangerous or potentially time-consuming situation.149 
Others may not want to be seen with a police officer for fear 
that they may be perceived as complicit with law enforcement, 
or want to clear the way for police to focus their efforts on find-
ing the true offender. Many courts find that “[w]here the de-
fendant possesses an innocent explanation that does not risk 
prejudicing the jury against him, it would be expected that the 
defendant would present his purported reasons for his flight to 
the jury.”150 
However, there are times when the explanation for flight is 
not so innocuous. Step three—inferring that consciousness of 
guilt indicates consciousness of guilt for the crime charged—is 
often the most problematic and is where evidentiary inquiry 
usually focuses. Some people may be innocent of the criminal 
activity afoot but may flee because they are guilty of a separate 
offense, such as public intoxication or possessing an illegal 
drug.151 Individuals who flee because they are guilty of a differ-
ent offense are prejudiced because they must testify or other-
wise supply evidence of their less-than-innocent ulterior motive 
 
 148. KENNETH BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 263, at 458 (6th 
ed. 2006) (quoting United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 
1977)). 
 149. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 128–31 (2000) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896) (“[I]t is a matter of 
common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from 
the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, 
or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.”). 
 150. Thompson v. State, 901 A.2d 208, 222 (Md. 2006). 
 151. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 A.2d 60, 65–66 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2006) (involving a defendant charged with homicide who claimed he ran 
from police because he was in possession of marijuana). 
  
2017] CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 2271 
 
for flight. In these circumstances, depending upon the nature of 
the explanation, the probative value of their flight might be 
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, in 
which case it may be excluded at the trial judge’s discretion.152 
Irrespective of the nature of the explanation, requiring de-
fendants to testify about what motivated their flight is particu-
larly prejudicial if they have a criminal record. Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 609 and state equivalents of this rule, once a 
defendant or other witness takes the stand to testify, she or he 
opens her- or himself up to character impeachment by the pros-
ecutor, who may seek to introduce evidence of the defendant’s 
prior criminal convictions to attack his credibility.153 Specifical-
ly, in many instances, the prosecutor argues that the defend-
ant’s testimony is untrustworthy because he or she was previ-
ously convicted of a crime in a prior unrelated case. Studies 
show that jurors tend to hear prior-conviction evidence and in-
fer criminal propensity rather than poor credibility,154 regard-
less of instructions not to do so.155 In fact, it is well known that 
juries tend to convict based on a defendant’s prior record.156 Pri-
or convictions are extremely prejudicial,157 yet a criminal de-
 
 152. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Myers, 550 F.2d at 1046. 
 153. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 154. Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the 
Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision To Testify and on 
Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1371, 1373, 1381–83 (2009) (pre-
senting the results of an empirical study finding that defendants are less like-
ly to testify if they have a criminal record; when a defendant with a criminal 
record testifies the jury is forty-three percent more likely to learn of the crimi-
nal record; and in cases where the prosecution’s evidence is weak, the jury’s 
knowledge of the defendant’s criminal history is significantly associated with 
conviction, sometimes more than doubling the probability of conviction). 
 155. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. 
L. REV. 744, 753–55 (1959) (showing that jurors may not understand limiting 
instructions easily and that jurors may ignore them even if they understand 
them); A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Ef-
fect of S. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 96 
(1972) (concluding that prior-conviction evidence is often used impermissibly, 
regardless of a judge’s limiting instruction); Stanley Sue et al., Effects of In-
admissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 
3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 351–53 (1973) (finding that when there is 
little useful evidence, jurors often use evidence the judge instructs them not to 
consider). 
 156. Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 
609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (“It is widely accepted that in all likelihood a jury 
will consider the evidence for improper purposes.”). 
 157. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Prob-
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fendant may not have much choice but to testify about them 
when trying to explain an innocent reason why he or she fled 
from police. This is particularly concerning when the defendant 
is a person of color, since Rule 609 has a disproportionate effect 
on racial minorities. 
2. Racial Implications of Flight 
Rule 609 has been subject to a great deal of criticism,158 but 
like all Federal Rules of Evidence, we customarily assume it 
operates in a race-neutral manner.159 However, by applying 
CRT, scholars have exposed the racially biased operation of 
Rule 609.160 African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans 
are disproportionally subject to Rule 609 because of racial pro-
filing in police stops, over-policing in minority neighborhoods, 
the war on drugs, prosecutorial bias, racially disproportionate 
sentencing, and mass incarceration.161 Montré Carodine aptly 
argues that “the prior conviction impeachment rule gives evi-
dentiary value to race through its reliance on a criminal justice 
system that imposes the ‘Black tax,’ an unjustified disad-
 
lem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 495, 498–99 
(1995) (“Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides one of the most 
potent, and potentially prejudicial, methods of impeachment . . . . In a criminal 
case, when the defendant is impeached with his prior convictions, it is widely 
recognized that the defendant faces a unique, and often devastating, form of 
prejudice.”). 
 158. A primary criticism of Rule 609 is that allowing a defendant’s prior 
convictions to be admissible against him essentially allows an attack on his 
character. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character To Prove Conduct: Illu-
sion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 
(1982) (“[T]he impeachment rubric is a hoax, merely a cover for the admission 
of evidence bearing on propensity—which is what the rule’s defenders are 
probably seeking.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the 
Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Pri-
or Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 294 n.11 (2008); Montré D. 
Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Pri-
or Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521 (2009). 
 159. See Carodine, supra note 158, at 536–37. 
 160. Id. at 526; I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our Criminal Net-
work, and The Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459, 465–67 (2011); see also Anna 
Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 576 
(2014); Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimo-
ny: Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 860–73 (2016). 
 161. ALEXANDER, supra note 115, at 59–139 (discussing in depth the role 
played by the War on Drugs in the “systemic mass incarceration of people of 
color”); Carodine, supra note 158, at 535–36. 
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vantage to Blacks, and granting the ‘White credit,’ an unde-
served benefit to Whites.”162 
Further, using Rule 609 against a defendant of color en-
courages fact-finders to rely implicitly on racial character evi-
dence to conclude that the defendant is not credible because he 
or she has a criminal record.163 Specifically, “as most Americans 
associate Blacks with crime, revealing a Black defendant’s pri-
or convictions under Rule 609 reinforces widely held stereo-
types about Blacks and encourages jurors to engage in reason-
able racism.”164 Racial bias in the criminal justice system, 
coupled with Rule 609, leads to convictions based on the prior 
records of defendants of color. This leads to “repeat offender” 
status, which “keep[s] Blacks ensnared in the criminal system, 
perpetuating the criminalization of a staggering percentage of 
the Black population.”165 This analysis of the black experience 
also rings true for Latinos and Native Americans. 
An issue not yet explored is the unfairness of putting de-
fendants of color in the position of having to testify to explain 
their reasons for flight from authorities when the motivation to 
run was related to systemic racism. Philando Castile’s experi-
ence illustrates the reasons many men of color fear and take 
every effort, including flight, to avoid contact with the police. 
Castile was a thirty-two-year-old black man living and working 
in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metro area.166 In the last thirteen 
years of his life, he was stopped by police forty-nine times, os-
tensibly for minor traffic violations.167 At times, he did not have 
car insurance.168 This led to the revocation of his driver’s li-
cense, which in turn led to fines for driving without a valid li-
cense—a cycle of citations and fines that many low-income peo-
 
 162. Carodine, supra note 158, at 521. 
 163. Id. at 536. 
 164. Id. (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. at 526. 
 166. Sharon LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was Pulled over 
49 Times in 13 Years, Often for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-that-police 
-use-of-force-is-more-likely-for-blacks.html?_r=0; see also Mark Berman, Min-
nesota Officer Charged with Manslaughter for Shooting Philando Castile Dur-
ing Incident Streamed on Facebook, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/16/prosecutors-to 
-announce-update-on-investigation-into-shooting-of-philando-castile/?utm_ 
term=.9a63f3d9d99c. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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ple of color experience.169 On July 6, 2016, while he was driving 
with his girlfriend and her preschool-aged daughter, police 
stopped him, allegedly for a cracked taillight.170 As Castile 
reached for his identification—as instructed—the officer shot 
him dead.171 Castile’s girlfriend streamed a video of the after-
math on social media that sparked #BlackLivesMatter protests 
across the nation against racially targeted police violence.172 
In addition to heightened domestic awareness, there has 
been increased awareness internationally about United States 
police violence against racial minorities. Two days after Cas-
tile’s death, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Bahamas is-
sued a travel advisory to its citizens, who are predominately of 
Afro-Bahamian descent, concerning the “shootings of young 
black males by police officers” and advised all Bahamians, es-
pecially young males, to exercise “extreme caution” in their in-
teraction with police in the United States.173 Other countries, 
including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and New Zea-
land, issued similar warnings about travel to the United 
States.174 While consciousness of police violence against racial 
minorities might be new to some Americans, Americans of color 
have long recognized the dangers posed by interacting with the 
police. 
Racially targeted police violence is far from a new phenom-
enon. As former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper noted, po-
lice brutality in this country originated with slave patrols.175 
President Barack Obama acknowledged that the roots of racial-
ly motivated police shootings “date back not just decades” but 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Press Release, Bah. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Immigration Issues Travel Advisory for Bahamians Traveling to 
United States of America (July 8, 2016), http://mofa.gov.bs/ministry-of-foreign 
-affairs-and-immigration-issues-travel-advisory-for-bahamians-traveling-to 
-united-states-of-america. 
 174. Jackie Northam, U.S. Often Issues Travel Warnings, but Lately the 
Tables Are Turned, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/parallels/2016/07/14/485877515/u-s-often-issues-travel-warnings-but 
-lately-the-tables-are-turned. 
 175. NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX AMERICA’S PO-
LICE 15, 22 (2016); Ex-Seattle Police Chief Condemns Systemic Police Racism 
Dating Back to Slave Patrols, DEMOCRACY NOW! (July 14, 2016), https://www 
.democracynow.org/2016/7/14/ex_seattle_police_chief_condemns_systemic. 
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“centuries.”176 Not long ago, police enforced discriminatory slave 
codes and Jim Crow laws and turned a blind eye to mob vio-
lence and lynchings against blacks, all of which contribute to 
racial minorities’ history of distrusting the police.177 Today, Af-
rican Americans are 3.6 times more likely to be subject to use-
of-force by police178 and 2.5 times more likely to be shot and 
killed by police than are whites.179 Similarly, Latinos are killed 
by police in disproportionate numbers.180 And, although often 
overlooked by the media, Native Americans are the group most 
likely to be killed by police,181 as they are 3.1 times more likely 
to be killed by police than whites.182 
African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are of-
ten stopped and searched by police simply because of their 
race.183 A stop and frisk can easily lead to arrest. An arrest rec-
 
 176. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After White 
House Convening on Building Community Trust (July 13, 2016), https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/13/remarks-president 
-after-white-house-convening-building-community-trust. 
 177. Mia Carpiniello, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Per-
son Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
355, 362 (2001). 
 178. Timothy Williams, Study Supports Suspicion That Police are More 
Likely To Use Force on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-that-police-use-of-force-is-more 
-likely-for-blacks.html. 
 179. Wesley Lowery, Aren’t More White People than Black People Killed by 
Police? Yes, but No, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
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-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no. 
 180. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted 
-map-us-police-killings (last visited Apr. 20, 2017); see also Kenya Downs, Why 
Aren’t More People Talking About Latinos Killed by Police?, PBS (July 14, 
2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/black-men-werent-unarmed 
-people-killed-police-last-week. 
 181. Stephanie Woodard, The Police Killings No One Is Talking About, IN 
THESE TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/features/native_ 
american_police_killings_native_lives_matter.html. Native Americans are also 
more likely to die in police custody and jail, or by other “death by legal inter-
vention.” Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Vikram Dodd, Police up to 28 Times More Likely To Stop and 
Search Black People—Study, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2012), https://www 
.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jun/12/police-stop-and-search-black-people (report-
ing that police are “up to 28 times more likely to use stop-and-search powers” 
against blacks than whites); Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C.L. UNION, https:// 
www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (report-
ing that in 2014, eighty-two percent of New Yorkers stopped by police on the 
street were “totally innocent” but fifty-three percent of those stopped were 
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ord comes with serious consequences, as it may negatively im-
pact efforts to obtain housing and employment,184 since both 
landlords and employers increasingly check criminal back-
grounds.185 In addition to the tangible effects of arrest is the se-
rious risk of harming the person’s dignity. People are demeaned 
when they are wrongfully assumed to be guilty of a crime, 
stopped, and searched because of their race.186 
Commentators have described black and Latino communi-
ties as de facto police states where heavy police presence and 
intrusion pervades and criminalizes many aspects of daily 
life.187 Behaviors and activities that would not be subject to po-
lice intervention in white communities are targeted in black 
and Latino neighborhoods.188 For instance, people of color are 
more likely than whites to be arrested for low-level offenses for 
 
black compared to only twelve percent who were white; in 2015, eighty percent 
of all New Yorkers stopped were innocent but fifty-four percent were black). 
 184. See Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest 
Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 472 (2014) (“There is 
substantial research showing that arrested youth are not only more likely to 
experience immediate negative consequences such as contact with the justice 
system, school failure and dropout, and family difficulties, but these problems 
are likely to reverberate long down the life course in terms of additional ar-
rests, job instability, lower wages, longer bouts with unemployment, more re-
lationship troubles, and long-term health problems including premature 
death.”). 
 185. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L 
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORM-
ING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2011), http://www 
.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf (reporting 
that ninety percent of companies in a study conducted background checks on 
prospective employees). See generally David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal 
Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5 (2008). 
 186. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and 
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679 (1994) (“Even stops 
and frisks that do not result in charges carry a cost, however, albeit one that 
remains largely invisible: Large numbers of people are searched and seized, 
and treated like criminals, when they do not deserve to be.”); Kevin R. Johnson, 
The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Ra-
cial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 348 (2003) (“Dignitary 
harms to Latinas/os lawfully in the United States, including embarrassment, 
humiliation, and other attacks on their membership in U.S. society, result 
from the unjustified interrogation of their citizenship status.”). 
 187. See Harris, supra note 186, at 677 (discussing how jurisprudence that 
allows more liberal stop-and-frisks in inner-city areas creates an “open season” 
on minorities). 
 188. Id. at 660 (noting that “location plus evasion” case law allowing for 
more liberal stop-and-frisks in high crime areas creates a separate justice sys-
tem for whites from blacks, as these “locations” are usually minority neigh-
borhoods). 
  
2017] CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 2277 
 
which greater police discretion is accorded, such as loitering, 
being in a public park after closing, or drinking alcohol in pub-
lic.189 Further, people of color are often lower income and less 
able to pay fines or miss work to appear in court. This results 
in a disproportionate number of people of color being on proba-
tion or having warrants pending for low-level offenses.190 Hav-
ing an outstanding warrant for something as harmless as un-
paid parking tickets can motivate a person to avoid the police. 
Additionally, people of color and those living in poverty are less 
likely to possess government-issued identification,191 making it 
more likely that they will be cited, taken into custody, or, in the 
case of some immigrant Latinos, accused of living undocument-
ed. 
For many Latinos, the threat of immigration enforcement 
is an additional looming layer of police presence that may moti-
vate them to run even when innocent of any crime. The Latino 
experience of “brown flight” is akin to that of the black experi-
ence, as Latinos are similarly fearful of police because of over-
policing, racial profiling, and police violence. While the media 
reports on their experiences less frequently,192 Latinos, like Af-
rican Americans, are brutalized and killed by police at a higher 
rate than whites.193 Latinos, however, are uniquely disadvan-
 
 189. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., SELECTIVE POLICING: RACIALLY 
DISPARATE ENFORCEMENT OF LOW-LEVEL OFFENSES IN NEW JERSEY 12 
(2015), https://www.aclunj.org/files/7214/5070/6701/2015_12_21_aclunj_select_ 
enf.pdf; see also Al Baker, Brooklyn Program Erasing Warrants for Low-Level 
Offenses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/ 
nyregion/in-brooklyn-an-effort-to-erase-warrants-for-low-level-offenses.html. 
 190. See supra note 189. 
 191. According to one study, twenty-five percent of blacks do not possess 
the kind of photo identification required by strict voter ID laws. See BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST., N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF 
AMERICANS’ POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHO-
TO IDENTIFICATION 3 (2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
legacy/d/download_file_39242.pdf. 
 192. See generally Roque Planas, Why the Media Pays Less Attention to Po-
lice Killings of Latinos, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/24/police-killings-latinos_n_6739448.html; Rick 
Rojas & Samantha Schmidt, Amid Protests over Police Shootings of Black Men, 
Latinos Note a Disparity, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/amid-protests-over-police-shootings-of-black-men 
-latinos-note-a-disparity.html; Nicole Santa Cruz et al., Why the Deaths of La-
tinos at the Hands of Police Haven’t Drawn as Much Attention, L.A. TIMES (Ju-
ly 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-0718-latino-police 
-20150718-story.html. 
 193. In 2015, twenty-five percent of all Hispanics and Latinos killed by po-
lice were unarmed. Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice 
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taged. They must also combat issues of perceived foreignness in 
policing, irrespective of whether they are native-born Ameri-
cans or immigrants.194 
After the enactment of the Support Our Law Enforcement 
and Safe Neighborhoods Act—better known as S.B. 1070195 in 
Arizona in 2010 and similar laws in other states196—some local 
police are required to attempt to ascertain the immigration sta-
tus of anyone detained if “reasonable suspicion exists that the 
person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United 
States.”197 In practice, “reasonable suspicion” usually means 
“Mexican appearance.”198 Such “show-me-your-papers” laws in-
vite racial profiling despite official prohibitions to the contrary. 
Latinos are targeted for being “illegal” based on their race, 
Spanish-language usage, or Hispanic accent, notwithstanding 
that one-third of the Unites States’ land mass used to be Mexi-
co199 and that the United States is currently the world’s second 
largest Spanish-speaking country.200 Also, undocumented im-
migrants are not the only Latinos who may have reason to 
avoid law enforcement. United States citizens, legal permanent 
residents, and other lawfully present Latinos are frequently de-
tained simply because they are perceived to be undocumented 
 
as Likely To Be Unarmed as White People, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by 
-police-analysis. Additionally, Hispanics are killed by police at a rate thirty 
percent above the average and 1.9 times the rate of whites. Mike Males, Who 
Are Police Killing?, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www 
.cjcj.org/news/8113. 
 194. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Wat-
son, Crick, and Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award 
Speech), 47 HOW. L.J. 473, 489–90 (2004). 
 195. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 196. Five more states passed laws authorizing state-level immigration reg-
ulation less than two years after S.B. 1070’s passage. These five states are Al-
abama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah. A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L 
COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE WRONG APPROACH: STATE ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEG-
ISLATION IN 2011, at 6 (2012). 
 197. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012). 
 198. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the 
Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States 
and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1037 (2010). 
 199. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Language Disenfranchisement in Juries: A 
Call for Constitutional Remediation, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 811, 857 (2014). 
 200. Stephen Burgen, U.S. Now Has More Spanish Speakers than Spain—
Only Mexico Has More, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2015), https://www 
.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/29/us-second-biggest-spanish-speaking 
-country. 
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immigrants.201 Additionally, because some Latinos may come 
from mixed-immigration status families or friendship circles, 
they may avoid police in an effort to protect their loved ones.202 
History and social science203 suggest black and brown flight 
is often more likely to stem from fear and self-preservation 
than from guilt. Because of high levels of racial profiling, as 
well as racially targeted police harassment and brutality, flight 
from police by people of color is often rational. Fleeing from the 
police in many African American, Latino, and Native American 
communities has arguably become the norm in some communi-
ties.204 For many people of color, flight is a reflexive response to 
a police encounter on the street.205 History and experience have 
 
 201. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror: Immi-
gration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 194 (2009) (“Citizens of this country are 
also being detained by immigration officials; on occasion, they are even de-
ported.”); Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending 
Racial Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 
21 (2005) (“Conducting traffic stops of Latinos due to officers’ preconceived no-
tions about the immigrant status of motorists and passengers sends a strong 
message to legal Hispanic residents that they do not belong in this country.”). 
 202. According to a 2008 study, fifty-seven percent of Hispanics reported 
that they were concerned that they themselves, a family member, or a close 
friend would be deported. Mark Hugo Lopez & Susan Minushkin, Hispanics 
See Their Situation in U.S. Deteriorating; Oppose Key Immigration Enforce-
ment Measures, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
2008/09/18/2008-national-survey-of-latinos-hispanics-see-their-situation-in-us 
-deteriorating-oppose-key-immigration-enforcement-measures. 
 203. See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Proce-
dure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 751–52 (2000) (citing and discussing 
ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” 
PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/ 
default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf ). 
 204. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132–33 (2000) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“Among some citizens, particularly minorities . . . there is also the 
possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without 
justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous . . . . 
Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers them-
selves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into their own 
practices.”); Harris, supra note 187, at 680 (“Many African-American males 
can recount an instance in which police stopped and questioned them or some-
one they knew for no reason, even physically abusing or degrading them in the 
process.”). 
 205. See Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment 
Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 397 (2001) (“Such efforts to 
evade police are not evidence of guilt, but rather are reasonable (and perhaps 
reflex) reactions by a culture with a history of being victimized by the law en-
forcement regime.”). 
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taught people of color that the police cannot be trusted and that 
avoiding them is usually the best option.206 Parents of color 
teach their children about “safe” behavior around police, which 
may include “keep[ing] their hands visible[,] . . . ask[ing] per-
mission to make any move with hands or body,” and, most sali-
ent here, running from them.207 
3. Disparate Admissibility of Racialized Reality Evidence 
In determining whether a defendant of color’s flight is pro-
bative of his or her guilt, a key assumption is often overlooked. 
It is presupposed that innocent people do not run from the po-
lice but instead voluntarily and readily submit to police ques-
tioning and detention. However, flight from authorities is pro-
bative of consciousness of guilt only if fleeing is abnormal. In 
other words, flight is relevant to prove guilt only if it deviates 
from the typical behavior of normal, reasonable people in the 
community. As explained above, in many African American, 
Latino, and Native American communities, flight is standard 
custom. Assuming that black and brown flight is atypical and 
thus deviant is not merely erroneous; it raises significant racial 
justice and evidentiary concerns. 
The assumption that innocent people do not actively avoid 
or outright flee from the police and immigration authorities is 
based on white beliefs and norms. For multiple reasons, it is 
unsurprising that white society holds this belief. First, whites 
trust the police more than other racial groups.208 This makes 
sense; whites are the group least likely to be racially profiled or 
 
 206. See John Eligon, Running from Police Is the Norm, Some in Baltimore 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/us/ 
running-from-police-is-the-norm-some-in-baltimore-say.html; Will Jawando, 
What Makes Black Men Run from Police?, ROOT (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www 
.theroot.com/what-makes-black-men-run-from-the-police-1790860928; Neeraja 
Viswanathan, Why Black People Running from the Police Makes Perfect Sense, 
IN THESE TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/article/17882/why 
-black-people-running-from-the-police-makes-perfect-sense. 
 207. Kai EL’Zabar, Why Do Black Men Run from Police?, CHI. DEFENDER 
(May 22, 2015), https://chicagodefender.com/2015/05/22/why-do-black-men-run 
-from-police (referencing a man who teaches his sons not to wear sandals so 
they are ready to run from the police if necessary). 
 208. Bruce Drake, Divide Between Blacks and Whites on Police Runs Deep, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/ 
28/blacks-whites-police; Mark Hugo Lopez & Gretchen Livingston, Hispanics 
and the Criminal Justice System: Low Confidence, High Exposure, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/07/hispanics-and-the 
-criminal-justice-system. 
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otherwise targeted because of their race.209 Moreover, because 
police are over-representatively white in proportion to the gen-
eral population, whites are more likely to share the same racial 
background as the police than any other group.210 Most im-
portantly, whites enjoy more preferential treatment from police 
officers than other racial groups; for instance, they are less 
likely to be victims of force by the police211 or to be arrested for 
offenses even when they are statistically more likely to engage 
in the underlying prohibited conduct.212 Because whites gener-
ally trust, identify with, and receive preferential treatment 
from the police, it is clear why white experiences, norms, and 
beliefs signal and conclude that people do not run from the po-
lice unless they are guilty. 
It is important to recognize that in determining the admis-
sibility of flight evidence, the presupposition that only the 
guilty run from law enforcement is not commonsense reason-
ing. It is a fact that must be proved by admissible evidence. In 
most cases, this would require a qualified expert or lay witness 
who could testify that flight from police is abnormal in the per-
tinent community. However, it is not the practice of trial judges 
to require this type of evidence because the assumption that 
flight is abnormal is white “racialized reality evidence.” Cus-
tomarily, white racialized reality evidence receives “implicit ju-
 
 209. According to one study in Los Angeles, 37.6% more blacks and Latinos 
are stopped by the police than whites. Ian Ayres, Racial Profiling in L.A.: The 
Numbers Don’t Lie, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2008/oct/23/opinion/oe-ayres23. Latinos who are stopped are forty-three per-
cent more likely, and blacks who are stopped are 127% more likely, to be 
frisked than are whites who are stopped. Id. 
 210. On average, there are thirty percent more white police officers than 
white residents in the communities they serve. Jeremy Ashkenas & Haeyoun 
Park, The Race Gap in America’s Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/03/us/the-race-gap-in 
-americas-police-departments.html. According to the most recent comprehen-
sive data, minorities comprise only twenty-five percent of police forces. Id. 
 211. See supra notes 178–81. 
 212. We usually think about racial disparities in terms of minorities being 
statistically disadvantaged and ignore the parallel that whites statistically 
benefit. For example, according to one study, blacks make up 6.2% of marijua-
na users compared to whites who make up 84.6%, yet blacks constitute 36.4% 
of those arrested for marijuana possession. Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and 
Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 
49, 69 (2015). Similarly, blacks make up 15.6% of crack cocaine users, but they 
make up 63.1% of those arrested for its possession compared to 26.3% of 
whites. Id. 
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dicial notice.”213 It is automatically admitted at trial without ev-
identiary scrutiny. 
The conceptualization of racialized reality evidence is sig-
nificant because it identifies a type of persuasive evidence that 
receives racially disparate admissibility treatment but is ha-
bitually overlooked by jurists and lawyers. By racialized reality 
evidence, I mean evidence of the lived experience of a person 
that is directly shaped by the racially stratified system in 
which he or she lives. Racialized reality is how one experiences 
our nation’s current racial caste system as a benefit or detri-
ment. Racialization is not simply something experienced by ra-
cial minorities, with the racial majority living a raceless exist-
ence. As racism has a purpose of conferring a benefit on the 
privileged group or groups, racial privilege is always the corol-
lary of racial subordination. And because racial differentiation 
and racism permeate every aspect of daily life,214 there is rarely 
a race-neutral reality. Rather, people’s perception of the world 
around them depends largely on the position they occupy in so-
ciety’s racial hierarchy. This is true equally for racially subor-
dinated and racially privileged people. 
Racialized reality is different from cultural perspective. 
Cultural perspective originates internally within a cultural 
group, while racialized reality is imposed by the external racial 
structure in which we live. The white belief and norm that flee-
ing from authorities is abnormal is not owed to whites being 
more trusting culturally, respectful of authority, or law-abiding 
than other groups; it is a product of the privileged racial status 
whites experience in the United States. The corresponding 
racialized reality of many African Americans and Latinos—i.e., 
that police cannot be trusted and may even be dangerous and 
should be avoided—similarly does not stem from their cultures. 
Instead, it is a direct result of a subordinated racial status and 
is the racialized reality of many African Americans and Lati-
nos. 
Evidence of racialized reality is not cultural evidence and 
should not be subject to the same distrust that cultural evi-
dence receives. Cultural evidence is evidence of a person’s cul-
tural customs or beliefs. It is most frequently offered by crimi-
nal defendants to eliminate or mitigate their intent (or mens 
rea) to commit the charged offense. For instance, in New York 
 
 213. The concept of “implicit judicial notice” is explained infra Part III.A. 
 214. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 36, at 7. 
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v. Chen,215 a Chinese-born man charged with murdering his 
wife with a hammer called an expert witness to testify that his 
actions were a culturally normal reaction to learning that his 
wife committed adultery. Similarly, in California v. Kimura,216 
a Japanese-born woman offered evidence of the practice of par-
ent-child suicide in Japan after her children died when she 
tried to drown herself and them in the ocean following her hus-
band’s admission of infidelity.217 Cultural evidence has also 
been raised in rape cases where the defendant attempts to 
prove that, within his cultural context, he believed intercourse 
was consensual or otherwise culturally appropriate.218 
The primary criticisms of cultural evidence are that it neg-
atively stereotypes defendants’ cultures and that it is used to 
oppress vulnerable populations, namely women and children.219 
Though cultural evidence may be used appropriately to contex-
tualize minority perspectives and combat white normativity,220 
in its most high-profile use as a so-called “cultural defense,” 
non-white cultures are “othered” and cast as barbaric and mis-
ogynistic. 
In contrast, the theorization of racialized reality evidence 
is not based on cultural beliefs; it is evidence of how the racial 
caste system we live in affects people’s daily lives and shapes 
their perspectives. The use of racialized reality evidence, there-
fore, does not stereotype anyone’s culture.221 Racial groups sub-
 
 215. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 2, 1988). 
 216. People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (L.A. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985). 
 217. Id. 
 218. People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno Cnty. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985) 
(citing that defendant claimed that his kidnapping and forced intercourse with 
a Lao woman he planned to marry was consistent with the Hmong practice of 
“xij poj niam,” or marriage-by-capture); see Janet C. Hoeffel, Deconstructing 
the Cultural Evidence Debate, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303, 315 n.69, 316 
n.76 (2006) (discussing People v. Moua and two other cases in which Hmong 
defendants used cultural evidence to attempt to mitigate their crimes). 
 219. Hoeffel, supra note 218, at 304. 
 220. See discussion infra Part III.B; see also Holly Maguigan, Cultural Ev-
idence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a 
Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 36 (1995) (“Multi-
culturalists . . . advocate use of cultural information to counteract the injustice 
of applying the dominant culture’s legal standards to defendants from other 
cultures.”). 
 221. As in other critical race theory endeavors, it is important to avoid ra-
cial essentialism in the theorization of racialized reality evidence. Racial es-
sentialism is “the belief that there is a monolithic ‘Black Experience,’ or ‘Chi-
cano Experience.’” Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990). Rather, we should be vigilant in rec-
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ordinated by structural racism are not considered inherently 
weak or maladjusted, and racial groups benefitting from struc-
tural racism are not seen as intrinsically intolerant or oppres-
sive. Rather than pointing a finger at an internal cultural 
cause, racialized reality evidence recognizes structural racism 
as an external cause of distrust and a hindrance to communi-
ties of color, as well as a source of attitudes of entitlement and 
superiority by the racial majority. This approach emphasizes 
and blames the unjust system of structural racism that we live 
under and looks accordingly to systemic reform rather than fo-
cusing on individual prejudice. 
The presumption that fleeing from authorities is abnormal 
and deviant is evidence of white racialized reality and raises 
white normativity and transparency concerns. As mentioned 
previously, white normativity and transparency are the phe-
nomena where one’s whiteness is overlooked because it is the 
societal norm or standard-bearer, compared to other races.222 It 
is a problem in the criminal justice system when we consider 
only evidence from a “white” perspective, such as flight indicat-
ing guilt, because most judges, attorneys, and jurors do not re-
alize that this is white racialized reality evidence that places 
non-whites, whose experiences differ, at a direct disadvantage. 
4. Relevance and Probative Value of Black and Brown Flight 
In addition to racial justice concerns, black and brown 
flight raises evidentiary—specifically, relevance and preju-
dice—concerns. In instances where a defendant of color’s flight 
was a reaction to systemic racism rather than a consciousness 
of guilt, evidence of flight would not be relevant without proof 
that fleeing from the police is abnormal. Further, even if the 
flight evidence was relevant, its probative value is particularly 
low and could be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice, thereby rendering it inadmissible.223 
The introduction of black and brown flight as evidence of 
guilt presents a conditional relevance problem. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104(b) governs conditional relevance and states that 
“[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact ex-
ists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding 
 
ognizing intersectionality in peoples’ experiences. See Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
 222. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 223. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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that the fact does exist.”224 Though the phrasing of Rule 104(b) 
is opaque, the basic logic behind it is clear. Consider a simple 
hypothetical: A wife is on trial for the murder of her spouse’s 
mistress. The prosecution seeks to introduce evidence that the 
spouse was having an affair with the victim to show a motive of 
jealousy. Evidence of the affair is only relevant to prove jeal-
ousy if the wife knew about the affair. The wife’s knowledge of 
the affair is a preliminary fact that needs to be proven at trial 
for evidence of the affair to be relevant. A piece of evidence (the 
affair) is deemed conditionally relevant if its relevance is condi-
tioned upon proof of a predicate fact (the wife’s knowledge of 
the affair).225 If the proponent of the evidence cannot prove the 
predicate fact with admissible evidence, the conditionally rele-
vant evidence is inadmissible.226  
In the case of black or brown flight, the relevance of a de-
fendant’s flight depends on the prosecution proving that flight 
is atypical. The abnormality of flight is a preliminary fact that 
must be proven to make the proffered evidence of flight rele-
vant. The prosecution has the burden of proving this predicate 
fact. If the prosecution cannot supply sufficient admissible evi-
dence to support the abnormality of flight in the pertinent 
community or instance, the flight evidence is irrelevant and 
should not be admitted. However, in practice, since the predi-
cate fact that flight is abnormal is white racialized reality evi-
dence, courts do not require it to be formally introduced in the 
form of actual evidence that receives scrutiny. Instead, the 
predicate fact receives implicit judicial notice. 
Judicial notice is an evidentiary doctrine under which 
judges may recognize and admit a fact into evidence because it 
is too well-known or authoritative to be disputed. Federal Rule 
of Evidence 201(b) provides that a “court may judicially notice a 
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is 
generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; 
or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources 
 
 224. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
 225. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 226. 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 11:19 (7th ed. 2016); see also Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (holding a predicate fact is sufficiently es-
tablished if there is adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the fact exists); Dale A. Nance, Conditional 
Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447, 450 (1990) (“The judge makes a 
preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding of fulfillment of the condition. If so, the item is admitted.”).  
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whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”227 A court 
“may take judicial notice on its own; or . . . must take judicial 
notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the 
necessary information.”228 The concept of “implicit judicial no-
tice,” shows how evidence of white racialized reality is admitted 
into evidence without substantive proof. Due to white norma-
tivity, the predicate fact of the abnormality of flight is deemed 
outside the realm of reasonable dispute because it is readily, 
but incorrectly, assumed to be true from white experience and 
beliefs. Whiteness itself becomes an authority whose accuracy 
is not questioned. 
This type of implicit judicial notice is improper. Evidence 
should not be admitted automatically simply because it reflects 
white norms. Defense counsel should object, and the evidence 
should be barred by the court. However, due to white norma-
tivity and transparency, opposing counsel fails to raise proper 
relevancy objections or provide counterevidence of their clients’ 
racialized realities.229 This is a disservice to defendants and 
parties of color. In our example of flight, defense counsel should 
assert a relevance objection which, if successful, would place 
the burden on the government to submit evidence (such as ex-
pert witness testimony) that flight is abnormal in the given 
case. Further, even if black or brown flight is relevant, its pro-
bative value of proving guilt is remarkably low. Recently, in 
Commonwealth v. Warren, a ground-breaking opinion deter-
mining whether an investigatory stop was justified by reasona-
ble suspicion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
found: 
[F]light is not necessarily probative of a suspect’s state of mind or 
consciousness of guilt. Rather, the finding that black males in Boston 
are disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for [field interrogation 
observation] encounters suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated 
to consciousness of guilt. Such an individual, when approached by the 
police, might just as easily be motivated by the desire to avoid the re-
curring indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide 
criminal activity.230 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and equivocal state rules provide 
that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair 
 
 227. FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
 228. FED. R. EVID. 201(c). 
 229. For further discussion of objections, see infra Part III. 
 230. Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016). 
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prejudice.”231 Here, the low probative value of black and brown 
flight is substantially outweighed by the danger of racialized 
white normative views that only the guilty run from police, as 
well as prejudicial barriers to introducing counterevidence of 
minority racialized reality. 
5. Barriers to Minority Racialized Reality Evidence 
Not only does white racialized reality evidence habitually 
receive implicit judicial notice without objection from opposing 
counsel, defendants of color face prejudicial barriers to intro-
ducing counterevidence of their own racialized reality. Defend-
ants of color could most readily explain their racialized reality 
by taking the stand to speak about their personal experience. 
But this action might expose them to Rule 609 prior-conviction 
impeachment, a rule with a pronounced racially disparate im-
pact.232 Hence, it is likely that some defendants of color will not 
want to take the stand to explain their reason for fleeing. 
Another option would be to call a competent lay witness 
from the defendant’s community to speak about minority flight. 
Such testimony could be considered by the judge pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)233 to determine whether evi-
dence of flight should be submitted to the jury or the witness 
could testify at trial to rebut the prosecution’s evidence that 
flight is probative of guilt. However, if the lay witness testified 
at trial, it is likely such testimony would be met with an im-
proper lay opinion objection. But as I explain below, this type of 
lay opinion should be admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 701.234 Other times, the defense might consider a defend-
ant’s or lay-opinion-witness’s explanation insufficiently persua-
sive or effective. In either circumstance, an expert witness 
would be needed to present evidence of the racialized reality of 
people of color from the defendant’s community. Obtaining such 
an expert witness is, however, hindered by the considerable ob-
stacle of cost. 
 
 231. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 232. See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text. 
 233. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question 
about whether . . . evidence is admissible.”). Here the trial judge could consid-
er lay opinion about flight in defendant’s community to determine whether the 
Myers factors were met. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1035, 1049 (5th 
Cir. 1977); BROUN ET AL., supra note 148. 
 234. See infra text accompanying notes 345–55. 
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In most cases, securing an expert witness is prohibitively 
expensive for a criminal defendant. The average hourly fee for 
expert witness testimony is $488, or $322 for nonmedical ex-
pert testimony.235 Because racial minorities are disproportion-
ately indigent,236 many defendants of color are represented by a 
public defender. Expert witnesses are typically paid through 
the public defenders’ budgets,237 but these budgets are generally 
too small to acquire expert witnesses for the volume of cases 
public defenders handle.238 The Bureau of Justice Assistance 
found that third-party expenses, like expert-witness fees, are 
one of the “main financial barriers to effective access to the tri-
al court.”239 Thus, it is likely that an indigent minority defend-
ant would not be able to afford an expert witness to testify 
about the racialized reality of people of color in his or her com-
munity. Further, because there is a lack of racial diversity 
among qualified expert witnesses, it is likely that a defendant 
of color could only submit evidence of his racialized reality 
through a white or other “insider” voices.240 
 
 235. Joe O’Neill, Expert Witness Fees: An Infographic, EXPERT INST. (Sept. 
23, 2016), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fees. The aver-
age hourly fee for case review is $351 and $459 per hour for a deposition. Id. 
 236. In 2012, 9.7% of non-Hispanic whites were living in poverty, compared 
to 27.2% of blacks and 25.6% of Hispanics. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 
at 13–15 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf. 
 237. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F. X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999, at 4 (2000), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf (“Eighty percent or more of the 
public defender programs indicated their expenditures included funding for 
expert, investigator, interpreter, and transcript services.”). 
 238. Rita A. Fry, Gideon at Forty: The Promise Comes with a Price Tag, 
NLADA CORNERSTONE, Winter 2002–03, at 2 (“Indigent defense needs in-
creased funding to keep pace with the prosecution’s use of technical evi-
dence.”). 
 239. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRIAL COURT 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS WITH COMMENTARY 1, 9 (1997), https://www.ncjrs 
.gov/pdffiles1/161570.pdf. 
 240. Because the qualifications to serve as an expert witness do not depend 
on a certain amount of experience or the possession of a particular degree, it is 
difficult to obtain an accurate set of demographic data for race of expert wit-
nesses. See, e.g., Santana Marine Serv., Inc. v. McHale, 346 F.2d 147, 148 (5th 
Cir. 1965). It is safe to say that Ph.D.-holders are certainly qualified to serve 
as expert witnesses in their fields, so we can consider racial breakdowns of 
Ph.D.-holders to be relevant in trying to ascertain the racial breakdowns of 
expert witnesses. According to one study of Ph.D. completion over twelve aca-
demic years between 1992 and 2004, six percent of individuals working on a 
Ph.D. were black and three-to-four percent were Hispanic. COUNCIL OF GRAD-
UATE SCH., PH.D. COMPLETION AND ATTRITION: ANALYSIS OF BASELINE DE-
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C. CROSS-RACIAL WITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AND BIAS 
In the summer of 1984, a black man raped Jennifer 
Thompson, a white college student.241 Driven by a tenacious will 
to survive, Thompson remained focused during the assault and 
memorized her attacker’s face, body, and voice.242 She escaped, 
gave the police a detailed description of her attacker, and later 
identified Ronald Cotton as her rapist in a photo array, lineup, 
and at trial.243 Thompson was convinced she had found her rap-
ist; so was the jury.244 Cotton spent nearly eleven years in pris-
on, until DNA evidence revealed that he was innocent and an-
other man was guilty of this and similar sexual assaults.245 This 
story is remarkable, but not because a white witness misidenti-
fied a black man. Sadly, cross-racial identification errors are so 
commonplace that they cannot be considered unusual or excep-
tional.246 The story is remarkable because, with grace and mer-
cy, Cotton forgave his accuser; they became good friends, wrote 
a book together,247 and now speak publicly about the shortcom-
ings of eyewitness testimony.248 
 
MOGRAPHIC DATA FROM THE PH.D. COMPLETION PROJECT, EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY 1, 1 (2008), http://www.phdcompletion.org/information/executive_ 
summary_demographics_book_ii.pdf. A more recent study shows a slight in-
crease in minority Ph.D.-holders, reporting that blacks made up 7.4% and 
Hispanics comprise 5.8% of Ph.D.-holders in the 2009–10 academic year. Doc-
tor’s Degrees Conferred by Postsecondary Institutions, by Race/Ethnicity and 
Sex of Student: Selected Years, 1976–77 Through 2014–15, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_324.20.asp 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2017). Generally, these statistics reflect a lack of diversi-
ty among Ph.D.-holders, which may negatively affect the pool of minority ex-
perts available for a defendant seeking to introduce racialized reality evidence. 
 241. Cynthia E. Jones, “I Am Ronald Cotton”: Teaching Wrongful Convic-
tions in a Criminal Law Class, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 609, 609 (2013) (citing 
the documentary What Jennifer Saw (PBS television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/interviews/-thompson 
.html). 
 242. What Jennifer Saw, supra note 241. 
 243. Jones, supra note 241. 
 244. What Jennifer Saw, supra note 241. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in 
Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 935–36 (1984) (discussing the un-
just conviction of William Jackson, an innocent black man, for rape on the ba-
sis of an incorrect cross-racial identification, and the fact that this was “nei-
ther a unique occurrence nor random misfortune”). 
 247. JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO & RONALD COTTON, PICKING COTTON: 
OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009). 
 248. Id. at 278–81; Jones, supra note 241, at 609 n.1. 
  
2290 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2243 
 
Cross-racial witness identifications are another example of 
the dual-race evidentiary system. The relative ease of entering 
cross-racial identifications by white witnesses into evidence 
stands in stark contrast to the weighty barriers imposed upon 
defendants of color when they attempt to counter this evidence 
with well established social science that challenges the reliabil-
ity of, and reveals the racial bias embedded in, such identifica-
tions. 
Witness identifications are an especially important kind of 
evidence to submit to a critical race analysis because they are 
particularly determinative in finding guilt and considered so 
reliable that they are afforded hearsay exemption status.249 
Witness identifications are among the most influential items of 
evidence that jurors rely upon in determining if a defendant is 
guilty of a crime. Overwhelming research demonstrates that 
jurors tend to believe eyewitness testimony above all else, even 
in the face of significant doubt.250 The persuasiveness of eyewit-
ness identifications is compounded when the eyewitness is 
white because of the racial character evidence of whiteness, 
where white witnesses are deemed more credible and trustwor-
thy than people of other races.251 The accuracy and reliability of 
eyewitness identifications are, therefore, paramount. Scholars 
have frequently recognized that eyewitness identifications can 
 
 249. If a “declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a 
prior statement, and the statement . . . identifies a person as someone the de-
clarant perceived earlier” the statement is deemed non-hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(1). 
 250. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a live human be-
ing who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the 
one!’” (citations omitted) (quoting E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 
(1979))); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (“[J]uries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to [identification] . . . 
evidence . . . .”); Hon. D. Duff McKee, Challenge to Eyewitness Identification 
Through Expert Testimony, in AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 1, 
8§  (3d ed. 1996) (“Eyewitness testimony may be the least reliable, and yet the 
most compelling.”); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE 
VERDICT 194 (2007) (“Judges and legal scholars have recognized . . . for over a 
century . . . that jurors frequently accord eyewitness identification [evidence] 
too much weight.”). 
 251. See supra Part II.A. 
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be unreliable.252 However, cross-racial identifications are par-
ticularly untrustworthy.253 
Cross-racial identification is the process by which an eye-
witness of one race identifies a criminal suspect of another 
race.254 In criminal investigations where the offender’s identity 
is at issue, typically an eyewitness is asked to make a pretrial 
identification of an apprehended suspect through a lineup, 
showup, or photo array.255 After a positive identification, the 
suspect is charged and brought to trial, where the eyewitness 
can provide an in-court identification.256 The prosecution can al-
so have the eyewitness testify about the prior identification or 
call a third party present at the prior identification procedure 
to testify about the pretrial identification.257 A witness’s in-
court statement about her pretrial identification meets the 
basic definition of hearsay, as it is an out-of-court statement of-
fered for its truth.258  
However, a declarant-witness’s prior statement identifying 
the defendant as someone previously perceived or identified by 
the witness is generally exempted from the hearsay rule and 
admissible at trial.259 Though they are hearsay within the defi-
nition of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), prior identifications 
are deemed more reliable than in-court identifications because 
the prior identification occurred closer to the event in question 
and is still fresh in the witness’s mind.260 Additionally, prior 
identifications are less likely to be the product of an improper 
influence, like a bribe, threat, or pressure to identify the de-
fendant in the courtroom as the guilty party.261 
 
 252. Taki V. Flevaris & Ellie F. Chapman, Cross-Racial Misidentification: 
A Call to Action in Washington State and Beyond, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 861, 
866–67 (2015). 
 253. Id. at 870–71. 
 254. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-
Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001). 
 255. James Lang, Note, Hearsay and Relevancy Obstacles to the Admission 
of Composite Sketches in Criminal Trials, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1984). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.; Gilbert M. Rein, “That’s the Guy!”: Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(C) and Out-of-Court Statements of Identification, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1539, 1543–44 (2013). 
 258. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 259. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). 
 260. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 801.23 (Mark S. Brodin ed., 2d ed. 2016). 
 261. Id. 
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Cross-race bias (also referred to as other-race effect, other-
race bias, or own-race bias) is the inability of people to accu-
rately recognize and identify people of other races.262 Consider-
able research demonstrates that most people tend to have a 
cross-race bias; witnesses can fairly accurately identify mem-
bers of their own race, but they are considerably impaired when 
identifying members of another race.263 Cross-race bias has 
been documented to affect whites more than blacks.264 In other 
words, white witnesses are particularly unable to identify non-
white people accurately, while blacks are much more adept at 
identifying white suspects.265 This was the case for Jennifer 
Thompson. She believes that cross-race bias played a role in 
her misidentification of Cotton as her rapist.266 Even today, she 
courageously admits, “[b]ecause of my public speaking, I’m now 
in contact with more races than most white women I know, . . . 
but I don’t think my ability to discriminate among black faces 
has gotten any better.”267 
CRT invites us to question why white witnesses are the 
group least likely to identify people of other races accurately. 
There is no indication that white people are less observant, 
thoughtful, able to remember details, or physically or intellec-
tually unable to observe, perceive, and recall physical features 
and other identifying details. Rather, science shows that people 
of color, especially blacks, actually look the same to white peo-
ple. “All you people look the same” is a well-known racial epi-
 
 262. BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: 
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 104 (1995), https://www.ncjrs 
.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/159775NCJRS.pdf; Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. 
Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do 
About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 230 (2001). 
 263. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 262; Rutledge, supra note 254, at 104. 
 264. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 246, at 939–41; Rutledge, supra note 
254, at 211. Four studies found that black eyewitnesses do not have impair-
ment when cross-racially identifying, as they identified white and black sub-
jects with the same degree of accuracy. Johnson, supra note 246, at 940. How-
ever, five more studies found that black eyewitnesses do experience some 
cross-race bias. Id. 
 265. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 246, at 939–41; Rutledge, supra note 
254, at 211. 
 266. Mark Roth, Looking Across the Racial Divide: How Eyewitness Testi-
mony Can Cause Problems, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www 
.post-gazette.com/news/science/2010/12/26/Looking-across-the-racial-divide 
-How-eyewitness-testimony-can-cause-problems/stories/201012260195. 
 267. Id. 
  
2017] CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 2293 
 
thet. It appears that this racialized phenomenon actually can 
be proved through science.268 
Psychologists generally attribute cross-race bias to two 
causes: racial segregation and automatic categorization of out-
group members.269 “Perceptual-expertise models of the [cross]-
race bias suggest that low levels of contact with different-race 
faces result in a lack of expertise in the perceptual encoding of 
these faces, and it is this poor encoding that leads to worse 
recognition of different-race faces compared to same-race fac-
es.”270 “[T]he social-categorization models of the [cross]-race bias 
suggest that, because of reduced levels of contact with differ-
ent-race faces, [people] have learned to categorize different-race 
individuals as out-group members, and thus to pay attention 
only to shared, group-level features when encoding their fac-
es.”271 Thus, due to widespread racial isolation in places of resi-
dence, schools, and life generally, people are unable to distin-
guish racial outsiders accurately and find that members of a 
racial group look the same. 
Some have interpreted the social-psychology explanation 
behind cross-race bias as proof that this bias is not racist. “It is 
not bias or bigotry . . . that makes it difficult for people to dis-
tinguish between people of another race. It is the lack of early 
and meaningful exposure to other groups.”272 This explanation 
may negate conscious racial bias, but it ignores unconscious ra-
cial bias and how structural racism works as a system to sub-
ordinate people of color. 
Whites are the most segregated race of any racial group.273 
It is, therefore, not surprising that they are the group most 
 
 268. See Siri Carpenter, Why Do ‘They All Look Alike’?, 31 MONITOR ON 
PSYCHOL., Dec. 2000, at 44. 
 269. Kirin F. Hilliar et al., Now Everyone Looks the Same: Alcohol Intoxica-
tion Reduces the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
367, 368–69 (2010). 
 270. Id. at 368. 
 271. Id. at 369. 
 272. Rachel L. Swarns, The Science Behind ‘They All Look Alike to Me,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/nyregion/the 
-science-behind-they-all-look-alike-to-me.html. 
 273. White social networks are ninety-one percent white, and only one per-
cent black and one percent Hispanic. Remarkably, seventy-five percent of 
whites have entirely white social networks. In contrast, black Americans’ so-
cial-network racial homogeneity is lower at sixty-five percent, and Hispanics’ 
is even lower at forty-six percent. Robert P. Jones, Self-Segregation: Why It’s 
So Hard for Whites To Understand Ferguson, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/08/self-segregation-why-its 
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likely to have cross-race bias. However, this is only half the sto-
ry. Racist laws, policies, and personal preferences have caused 
racial isolation. Factors contributing to today’s racial isolation 
for whites include racial segregation in schools, racial redlining 
in housing, “white flight,” racial discrimination in employment, 
and personal choices about which races to socialize with and 
marry.274 It may be true that the cross-race bias effect stems 
from a lack of familiarity with different races, but it should be 
recognized that this is a result of racial preference. Throughout 
United States history, whites as a group have consistently cho-
sen to isolate themselves racially and collectively received ben-
efits from doing so, ensuring that they have the greatest access 
to superior schools, housing, employment, and financial and so-
cial capital.275 
In addition to racial segregation, psychologists tell us that 
cross-race bias is caused by the automatic categorization of out-
group members.276 CRT scholarship on the social construction of 
race and purpose of racial differentiation provide insights into 
the cause of this phenomenon.277 Racial classifications are a 
product of society, not biology, science, or natural classifica-
tion.278 From an early age, children learn markers of racial as-
signment—skin color, hair texture, and certain facial fea-
tures—and classify people based upon these physical 
attributes.279 Socially constructed racial differences have taken 
center stage for how people recognize each other. Rather than 
seeing different-race persons as unique individuals, they are 
viewed first and foremost through their out-group race assign-
ment. 
The social construction of race does not end at categorizing 
people; it also imposes moral and character traits on racial 
 
-hard-for-whites-to-understand-ferguson/378928. 
 274. See generally George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, and Race, 71 
N.C. L. REV. 1421 (1993) (referencing relative socioeconomic class, employ-
ment opportunities, poor public education systems, and centralized housing in 
metropolitan areas to explain the segregation of black neighborhoods in U.S. 
cities). 
 275. See generally Mark Beaulieu & Tracey Continelli, Benefits of Segrega-
tion for White Communities: A Review of the Literature and Directions for Fu-
ture Research, 15 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 487 (2011). 
 276. Hilliar et al., supra note 269. 
 277. See Haney López, supra note 44, at 27–28; see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 278. Haney López, supra note 44, at 11–14, 27–28, 56 n.209. 
 279. See generally DEBRA VAN AUSDALE & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE FIRST R: 
HOW CHILDREN LEARN RACE AND RACISM (2001). 
  
2017] CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 2295 
 
groups.280 Thus, complexion, hair texture, and facial character-
istics attached with blackness become associated with untrust-
worthiness and criminality.281 Similarly, linguistic and cultural 
attributes are racialized and assigned character traits.282 
Speaking Spanish or having a Hispanic accent become racial 
identifiers to characterize a person as Latino.283 Those same 
traits are then associated with qualities like being uneducated, 
dirty, and prone to violence.284 It should come as no surprise, 
then, that when a witness—particularly a white witness—
perceives a person of color, he or she often does not look closer 
to discern the individual’s extensive unique features.285 This 
leads to misidentifications. Further, there is a risk that the 
witness will impose negative assumptions about the race he or 
she perceives: not only do “they” all look the same, “they” all 
look like criminals and wrongdoers. This contributes further to 
misidentifications because innocent people of color who happen 
to be near the scene of a crime are often mistakenly assumed to 
be the culprits. 
 Cross-race bias places black, Latino, and other defend-
ants of color at a distinct disadvantage in the courtroom. The 
United States criminal justice system is plagued with a long 
history of minorities being wrongfully convicted, particularly 
based on misidentification. According to the Innocence Project, 
sixty-two percent of the 349 individuals who received post-
conviction DNA exonerations in the United States since 1989 
were black, and seven percent were Latino.286 The Innocence 
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 285. See Harvey Gee, Eyewitness Testimony and Cross-Racial Identifica-
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and Black Faces by White and Black Subjects, 10 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 119, 122–
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Project has further discovered that eyewitness misidentifica-
tion testimony is the leading cause of the wrongful convictions, 
with seventy-one percent of the exonerated cases involving in-
correct identifications, of which at least forty-two percent of the 
eyewitnesses were of a different race than the defendant.287 The 
risk of cross-race misidentification is greatest where the victim 
is white and the defendant is black.288 Despite this fact, studies 
suggest that white witnesses are generally perceived as more 
reliable than black witnesses.289 This is another context in 
which racial character evidence harms defendants of color. 
The unreliability of cross-racial witness identifications also 
implicates hearsay rules. A witness’s testimony about his or 
her own prior statement is generally inadmissible hearsay, but 
identification of a person the witness perceived earlier is con-
sidered exempt from the hearsay rule.290 Prior identification 
statements are permitted because of their assumed accuracy, 
reliability, and necessity.291 When jurors are blinded by implicit 
racial preferences and automatically believe white witnesses in 
instances of cross-racial identification, notwithstanding that 
they are statistically the most untrustworthy racialized group 
to give such testimony, the evidence becomes unreliable. This 
subverts the intention and policy of the hearsay exemption. If a 
white witness were to testify that “all blacks look alike,” the 
statement would greatly diminish the weight of the testimony292 
because it would demonstrate acute risks of unreliability and 
bias. Though witnesses generally do not make these overt 
statements, this is the reality behind many cross-race identifi-
cations. The dangers posed by cross-race bias need to be re-
vealed at trial. 
 
 287. Id. It is worth noting that many more than forty-two percent of the 
identifications were cross-racial, as the Innocence Project is limited in the race 
data available for eyewitnesses. Id. 
 288. Gee, supra note 285, at 840. 
 289. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 170, 192 (2001). 
 290. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). 
 291. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s) for Hearsay Excep-
tions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2016) (explaining that the three ra-
tionales for the hearsay exceptions are reliability, necessity, and adequate 
foundation). 
 292. See People v. Bayless, 425 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“In 
like manner the victim’s statement to a defense counsel investigator that all 
blacks look alike to him . . . goes to the weight of his testimony.”). 
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Cross-race bias is often unconscious and not understood by 
lay persons on the jury.293 One of the most effective ways to 
combat the failings of cross-racial eyewitness identification is 
through expert-witness testimony about its shortcomings, so 
the jury can better assign the appropriate weight to such evi-
dence.294 However, courts have been inconsistent in allowing 
expert witnesses to testify about cross-race bias.295 Moreover, 
similar to our discussion of flight, even when expert testimony 
is permitted, the cost is prohibitive to most low-income defend-
ants who are represented by a public defender.296 
Eyewitness testimony is often flawed, but when the de-
fendant and the eyewitness are of the same race, these flaws 
are less likely to result in a wrongful conviction.297 When the de-
fendant is a person of color and the witness is white, however, 
the evidentiary rules supporting eyewitness identifications as 
accurate create a distinct disadvantage for the defendant. Un-
less juries and judges are aware of cross-race bias, people of 
color will continue to be wrongfully convicted as a result of in-
accurate cross-racial identifications. 
 
 293. Flevaris & Chapman, supra note 252, at 871 (“[R]esearch shows that 
most jurors are either misinformed about, or unaware of, the distinct inaccu-
racy of cross-racial identification . . . .” (citing Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eye-
witness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and 
Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
115, 125 (2006))). 
 294. See generally United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(providing a detailed history about how the use of expert witnesses has 
changed over four decades); Shirley K. Duffy, Using an Expert To Evaluate 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 83 N.Y. ST. B.J. 41 (2011); William David 
Gross, The Unfortunate Faith: A Solution to the Unwarranted Reliance Upon 
Eyewitness Testimony, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 307 (1999). 
 295. Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 3, 39 (2006) 
(noting that while the overwhelming majority of courts exclude this kind of 
expert testimony, the reasons cited for doing so are very inconsistent, includ-
ing that it would usurp the jury’s role as the determiner of credibility, the tes-
timony would not assist the trier of fact, it would mislead the jury, and in con-
junction with jury instructions it would address the substance of the proffered 
testimony). 
 296. See supra notes 235–239 and accompanying text. As previously dis-
cussed, the expense factor makes it unlikely that an indigent minority defend-
ant would be able to bring in an expert witness to discuss the unreliability of 
cross-racial identifications. 
 297. Flevaris & Chapman, supra note 252, at 866–67. 
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III.  A CRITICAL RACE RECONSTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
LAW   
Having explored examples of the modern-day dual-race ev-
identiary system, the final Part of this Article examines its 
structural causes and effects, and then provides initial sugges-
tions for reform. Section A compares the twenty-first century 
and eighteenth-to-nineteenth century dual-race evidentiary 
systems. It identifies a similar root cause: white superiority 
and normativity. Currently, assumptions about white superior-
ity and normativity mean that implicit judicial notice is taken 
of white racialized reality evidence without any request by its 
proponent, objection by the opponent, or evidentiary scrutiny 
by the court. The dual-race system of evidence benefits whites 
collectively and harms people of color. 
Section B explores how critical race evidentiary analysis 
can help judges be impartial and fair in their admissibility de-
terminations and can prepare litigators to effectively identify 
and object to racial inequity. One of the most important objec-
tions is found in Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and its state 
counterparts, which can be raised when prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of a piece of evidence. This Sec-
tion advances a new interpretation of Rule 403 which would 
recognize racism, in its explicit and implicit manifestations, as 
prejudice within the meaning of the rule. It further advocates 
for evidentiary pathways to be made for people of color to share 
their racialized experiences and expose systemic racism at tri-
al. 
A. STRUCTURAL CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE DUAL-RACE 
SYSTEM 
A century-and-a-half ago, the United States Supreme 
Court heard a horrific murder case hinging on the ability of 
people of color to testify as witnesses.298 Prompted by nothing 
but racial hatred, two white men brutally murdered multiple 
generations of an African American family, including a ninety-
year-old blind grandmother.299 Because the crime occurred 
while the family slept in their cabin, the only witnesses were 
family members—all of whom were black.300 The offenders’ con-
victions depended on the testimony of two witnesses, including 
 
 298. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871). 
 299. Id. at 585, 589. 
 300. Id. at 584–85. 
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a dying declaration by one of the victims, which identified the 
defendants as the perpetrators.301 However, the governing state 
of Kentucky had a statute that dictated: “[A] slave, negro, or 
Indian, shall be a competent witness in the case of the com-
monwealth for or against a slave, negro, or Indian, or in a civil 
case to which only negroes or Indians are parties, but in no oth-
er case.”302 Thus, the sole eyewitnesses were deemed incompe-
tent to testify and the convictions were in error, so the murder-
ers went free.303 
Today, the idea that a person could be overtly prevented 
from testifying solely on the basis of his or her race is abhor-
rent. Our evidence laws are free of any direct reference to race. 
However, even now certain types of evidence receive racially 
disparate admissibility treatment. Evidence of white racialized 
reality is fast-tracked to the jury without evidentiary scrutiny 
or objection; while evidence of the racialized reality of people of 
color is subject to arduous evidentiary hurdles. Reminiscent of 
the former race-based witness competency rules, there is still a 
racial-silencing effect when it comes to people of color testifying 
or otherwise introducing evidence about their experiences of 
systemic racism. 
Admittedly, the twenty-first century dual-race evidentiary 
system is different from that of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in several respects. The old rules were delineated in 
statutes or judicial decrees and explicitly barred particular ra-
cial groups from testifying against whites.304 Today, there are 
no explicit race-based witness competency rules, which is not 
surprising since such explicit disparate treatment would not 
pass constitutional scrutiny.305 However, both systems are fun-
damentally similar in that they are based on notions of whites 
being superior in reason, character, and behavior; and because 
they afford whites preferential treatment under the law of evi-
dence. 
Modernly, the dual-race system is rooted in both white su-
periority and normativity,306 where white racialized reality is 
unconsciously accepted as the norm and institutional racism is 
unnoticed by the majority of judges, attorneys, and jurors. This 
 
 301. Id. at 585. 
 302. Id. at 592. 
 303. Id. at 593. 
 304. See supra Part I.A. 
 305. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 306. WILLIAMS, supra note 53. 
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is not surprising since whites are overrepresented and people of 
color are underrepresented on the bench,307 bar,308 and in the ju-
ry box309 in proportion to their numbers in the general popula-
tion. Even people of color might adhere to white normativity in 
the sphere of the courtroom since it is a “white space” where 
courtroom participants are expected to “perform whiteness” ir-
respective of their racial or cultural backgrounds.310 
Assumptions by judges, attorneys, and jurors that the 
white experience is the norm means that implicit judicial notice 
of white racialized reality is often taken without request, objec-
tion, or evidentiary scrutiny. Attorneys fail to recognize when 
white racialized reality is not simply commonsense reasoning 
and must be proved through admissible evidence. Consequent-
ly, opposing counsel fails to object even though the evidence 
might be irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, presented in an im-
proper evidentiary form, or otherwise inadmissible.311 Similarly, 
blinded by white normativity, judges do not recognize when 
white racialized evidence is introduced and should be subject to 
evidentiary scrutiny. Moreover, juries often do not represent 
 
 307. In federal trial courts, 25.6% of active district court judges and 10.5% 
of senior district court judges are non-white. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF SE-
LECT CHARACTERISTICS 22 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426 
.pdf. In state trial courts, approximately thirteen percent of judges are people 
of color. ABA Standing Comm. on Judicial Indep., National Database on Judi-
cial Diversity in State Courts, http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/ 
national.cfm (last updated June 2010). 
 308. Approximately eleven percent of lawyers are people of color, despite 
the fact that people of color constitute approximately 38.5% of the population. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_ 
2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf. Whites make up approximately eighty-nine 
percent of attorneys although they are only 61.5% of the population. Id. 
 309. See Ashish S. Joshi & Christina T. Kline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A 
National Problem with Individual Consequences, AM. B. ASS’N (2015), http:// 
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversity-inclusion/news_ 
analysis/articles_2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual 
-consequences.html. 
 310. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordi-
nation of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 
(1992) (discussing Baltimore rent-court proceedings and how black tenants 
tried to mimic the expected white norms, or behavior and speech patterns in 
the courtroom); Amanda Carlin, The Courtroom as White Space: Racial Per-
formance as Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450, 471, 477–84 (2016) (con-
ducting a case study of the George Zimmerman trial and noting that jurors’ 
credibility determinations are more negative when minority witnesses do not 
“perform whiteness”). 
 311. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. 
  
2017] CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 2301 
 
the communities they come from, meaning juries are deprived 
of the “common-sense judgment of the community,” including 
understanding the racialized realities of diverse people.312 
The dual-race evidentiary system benefits whites in sever-
al ways. By allowing implicit judicial notice of white norms and 
racialized beliefs, white experience is affirmed and legitimized. 
Since evidence of white racialized reality is admitted without 
evidentiary scrutiny, there is no expense associated with estab-
lishing this evidence. If, for instance, opposing counsel made a 
proper objection and the prosecution was required to prove that 
flight from authorities was abnormal in a community and thus 
relevant to prove consciousness of guilt, this would require ex-
penditures for attorney research and securing testimony, in-
cluding potential expert witness expenses. Implicit judicial no-
tice of this evidence also means that there is no question 
whether the evidence will be admitted, which helps with litiga-
tion planning and strategy. In civil litigation, a white party lit-
igating against a party of color has a direct advantage. In crim-
inal prosecutions, whites are indirectly benefited by a 
defendant of color’s subordination. While most white people do 
not rejoice in the disproportionate conviction, sentencing, and 
incarceration of people of color, these events reaffirm white su-
periority and preferential treatment in society.313 
 
 312. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (observing that the 
exclusion of certain groups from juries can raise “at least the possibility that 
the composition of juries would be arbitrarily skewed in such a way as to deny 
criminal defendants the benefit of the common-sense judgment of the commu-
nity”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156–57 (1968) (reasoning that a ju-
ry should provide a defendant with “common-sense judgment” through “com-
munity participation” of his peers in his determination of guilt). 
 313. Many employers will not hire individuals with felony convictions, and 
the fact that blacks are disproportionately incarcerated means that whites do 
not have to compete for these limited resources. While eighty-to-ninety percent 
of polled employers would hire “former welfare recipients, workers with little 
recent work experience or lengthy unemployment, and other stigmatizing 
characteristics,” only forty percent said they would definitely or probably hire 
job applicants with criminal records in 2010. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, 
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, EX-OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET 
10 (2010), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf. 
Similarly, individuals with felony convictions are more often denied public 
housing and welfare benefits. Rebecca Beitsch, States Rethink Restrictions on 
Food Stamps, Welfare for Drug Felons, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 30, 
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/ 
2015/07/30/states-rethink-restrictions-on-food-stamps-welfare-for-drug-felons. 
This is a direct benefit to impoverished whites who also need access to these 
benefits. “A 1996 federal law prohibits felons with drug convictions from ob-
taining food stamps or welfare unless individual states choose to waive these 
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The dual-race evidentiary system harms people of color in 
a variety of ways. Where black, Latino, or other people of color’s 
experience differs from white experience, it is considered illegit-
imate unless proved through evidence. Proving black or brown 
racialized reality poses significant risks and expenses. It may 
require an expensive expert witness or having the defendant 
testify, implicating Rule 609-prior conviction risks, since people 
of color disproportionally have prior convictions.314 It cannot be 
anticipated whether racialized reality evidence of people of col-
or will be admitted. Further, while the perspectives of whites 
are accepted, the racialized experiences of people of color are 
silenced. This is particularly concerning when evidence tainted 
with structural racism, such as cross-racial identifications, is 
admitted easily and difficult to contradict. Moreover, due to the 
precedential principle of stare decisis and the practice of pub-
lishing judicial opinions, implicit judicial notice of white 
racialized reality is self-perpetuating. Case law is a kind of his-
tory-making. Just as the narratives and perspectives of people 
of color have been kept out of history books,315 these narratives 
and perspectives are kept out of legal history. This perpetuates 
white narratives where white beliefs and norms are taken as 
normal and racism appears to no longer exist. 
 
restrictions.” Id. (referencing the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012)). As of 2015, twenty-
four states have a partial ban on welfare for felony drug convictions and 
twelve still have a full ban. Id. Similarly, twenty-four states have a partial 
ban on food stamps for felony drug convictions and six still have a full ban. Id. 
Federal financial aid for college is also restricted when applicants have convic-
tions, opening more spaces for white students since many minority ex-felons 
cannot afford to attend college without a student loan. Students are ineligible 
for federal loans if they have been incarcerated for a drug offense. Betsy Ma-
yotte, Drug Convictions Can Send Financial Aid up in Smoke, U.S. NEWS 
(Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/ 
2015/04/15/drug-convictions-can-send-financial-aid-up-in-smoke; see also AL-
EXANDER, supra note 115, at 2 (explaining that a felony conviction legalizes 
“the old forms of discrimination”—employment and housing discrimination, as 
well as the denial of the right to vote, educational opportunities, food stamps, 
and jury service). 
 314. See ALEXANDER, supra note 115, at 8 (“[N]o other country in the world 
incarcerates such an astonishing percentage of its racial or ethnic minori-
ties.”); Carodine, supra note 158, at 535–36. 
 315. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 685 
(2005). 
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B. CRITICAL EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS AND PRAXIS 
The purpose of evidence law is to achieve the fair and effi-
cient administration of each proceeding, “ascertain[] the truth,” 
and “secure[] a just determination.”316 Despite honorable inten-
tions, evidence law is too often employed (or ignored) in ways 
that replicate and perpetuate the racial injustice prevalent in 
our society. The courtroom should be a refuge from societal 
prejudice and systemic inequalities, a place where all are enti-
tled to equal justice under the law. But too frequently, unfortu-
nately, this is not the case. As explored in the context of stand-
your-ground defense cases and cross-racial witness identifica-
tions, due to implicit racial bias, fact-finders too often use the 
race of witnesses as a proxy for character. Whiteness is de facto 
evidence of good character while blackness and brownness are 
de facto evidence of bad character. This implicit bias needs to 
be addressed explicitly by attorneys and judges. 
A critical race awareness and analysis of evidence law and 
practice by the bar and bench, in addition to the academy, 
might increase justice in our legal system. CRT is not simply a 
law professor’s pastime; it has practical application in litiga-
tion. For evidence purposes, CRT can train litigators to identify 
and object to racism effectively, and it can help judges become 
more impartial and fair when making evidence determinations. 
Hence, continuing legal education seminars on the basic princi-
ples of CRT should be offered more widely, rather than confined 
to the academic setting. 
Today, much racism is inconspicuous and unconscious, 
meaning racial unfairness goes undetected and unaddressed. 
Improprieties fall beneath trial judges’ radar, and attorneys fail 
to make proper objections. Instead of being complicit in racial 
injustice, jurists and attorneys can choose to consider the effect 
of racialization and racism critically in the sphere of evidence 
law. Critical race analytical tools can be used to evaluate the 
admissibility of evidence if we remember the purpose, perva-
siveness, and permanence of racism; the way racial privilege 
acts as a direct corollary of racial subordination; and the need 
for perspectives of people of color. Though racism has become 
 
 316. FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to adminis-
ter every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth 
and securing a just determination.”). 
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more subtle and sophisticated, it is ever-present and in need of 
continual remediation. 
It is also particularly important to look out for white nor-
mativity and transparency problems. The first step is to recog-
nize that assertions of white racialized reality may be more 
than mere argument; they may actually be evidence. The law-
yer may be improperly assuming facts not yet in evidence. In 
such circumstances, it is imperative that opposing counsel ob-
jects and demands that the court subject the proffered evidence 
to the full rigors of evidence law. As mentioned above in the 
discussion of black and brown flight, relevance objections may 
be particularly critical here.317 Evidence should not be implicitly 
judicially noticed simply because it reflects the beliefs, norms, 
or otherwise racialized reality of the majority racial group. 
In these circumstances, one of the most important objec-
tions is that of unfair prejudice. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
gives federal judges discretion318 to exclude otherwise relevant 
evidence when its “probative value is substantially outweighed 
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”319 Most 
state courts have rules similar, if not identical, to Rule 403.320 
Among the most significant and often-raised dangers listed in 
Rule 403 and its state counterparts is the risk of “unfair preju-
dice.”321 The term “unfair prejudice” means “an undue tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though 
not necessarily, an emotional one.”322 
Unfair prejudice describes two kinds of dangers: emotional-
ism and limited-use evidence employed for an impermissible 
purpose.323 It is often asserted that “[t]he greatest danger in-
cluded in the notion of ‘unfair prejudice’ is the injection of pow-
 
 317. The evidence might still be admissible as conditionally relevant, but 
the condition precedent (proof of the racialized reality) must be introduced in 
proper form or the evidence cannot be considered by the fact-finder. See supra 
notes 224–28 and accompanying text. 
 318. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 
§ 4:12 (4th ed. 2009). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for “extraordinary 
breadth of discretion” and the decision to admit or exclude evidence under 
Rule 403 can only be reversed for abuse. Id. 
 319. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 320. See JONES, supra note 226, § 11:10. 
 321. Id. § 11:14. 
 322. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. 
 323. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 318, § 4:13. 
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erful emotional elements, brought by proof that is unnecessari-
ly graphic or overwhelming in depicting cruelty, suffering, pain, 
sorrow, or outrageous or offensive conduct.”324 Classic examples 
of this kind of evidence are bloody or otherwise gruesome pho-
tographs, videos, or evidence that can be “best characterized as 
sensational or shocking; provok[ing] hostility or revulsion; 
arous[ing] punitive impulses; or appeal[ing] to emotion in ways 
that seem likely to overpower reason.”325 
The second kind of unfair prejudice is misuse of limited-use 
evidence by the trier of fact. This is where evidence would be 
properly admissible for one issue, purpose, or against one par-
ty, but the jury mistakenly and impermissibly considers the ev-
idence for a different issue, purpose, or party, despite an in-
struction to the contrary.326 For instance, evidence of a criminal 
defendant’s prior bad acts is generally not admissible to prove 
the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crime, but 
this evidence might be admissible for another purpose, like 
showing knowledge.327 
This traditional understanding and use of Rule 403 is in-
adequate because it overlooks racial prejudice and racism.328 
The common-language meaning of prejudice is “an irrational 
attitude of hostility directed against an individual, a group, a 
race, or their supposed characteristics.”329 In the Rule 403 con-
text, the vernacular meaning of prejudice has been largely ig-
nored. However, the dangers posed by racial prejudice and rac-
ism are wholly consistent with the “risk of unfair prejudice,” as 
contemplated under Rule 403. Evidence presents a threat of 
unfair prejudice when it has a potential to influence the jury to 
decide the case on an improper basis.330 It is hard to imagine a 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 328. It also overlooks other traditional kinds of prejudice such as sexism 
and heteronormativity/homophobia. 
 329. Prejudice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2003); see also Prejudice, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster 
.com/dictionary/prejudice (last visited Apr. 21, 2017) (providing a common-
language definition of “prejudice” specifically for English language learners: 
“[A]n unfair feeling of dislike for a person or group because of race, sex, reli-
gion, etc.”). 
 330. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note; Old Chief v. United 
States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). 
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more improper basis for a jury to decide a case upon than race 
or racism. 
The risk of unfair prejudice is of particular concern in crim-
inal cases, where: 
Unfair prejudice results from an aspect of the evidence . . . which 
makes conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional re-
sponse in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s at-
titude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his 
guilt or innocence of the crime charged.331 
Racial prejudice, including conscious, unconscious, individual, 
and institutional forms of racism, would likely tend to adverse-
ly affect jurors’ attitudes toward defendants of color. Due to the 
prevalence of racism in our society, the prejudice it poses is as 
much—if not more—of a danger than the more-commonly dis-
cussed risks under Rule 403, such as gruesome images or offen-
sive conduct. Racism, in all its forms, is a manifestly improper 
basis that poses a substantial danger of prejudice within the 
meaning of Rule 403. 
It is unsurprising that systemic racism has been over-
looked under Rule 403. In large part, this is because lay and le-
gal definitions of racism are construed narrowly to include only 
individual race-based animus, rather than the more pervasive 
existence and danger of white supremacy that has both inten-
tional and unintentional, and conscious and unconscious, as-
pects and manifestations. As Charles Lawrence explains, “Be-
cause racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to 
be transmitted by tacit understandings.”332 Thus, it is difficult 
to eradicate or even recognize.333 The most dangerous racial 
prejudice is not an overt call to racial hatred, which most peo-
ple would find repugnant; it is subtler, invidious racism that 
persuades while going unrecognized.334 To determine whether 
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the pro-
bative value of evidence, all forms of racism advanced by an 
item of evidence should be weighed against its probative value. 
 
 331. United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 332. Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987). 
 333. Id. 
 334. See Scott Wilson & Sari Horwitz, Holder, Confronting Issue of Race 
Once More, Says ‘Subtle’ Threats to Equality ‘Cut Deeper,’ WASH. POST (May 
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/holder-confronting-issue 
-of-race-once-more-says-subtle-threats-to-equality-cut-deeper/2014/05/17/ 
66e63482-dd57-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html. 
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Establishing that a piece of evidence poses a risk of racial 
prejudice is not the end of a Rule 403 analysis. Relevant evi-
dence cannot be excluded under Rule 403 unless the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. 
Thus, the unfair prejudice of introducing an item of evidence 
must be weighed against its probative value. The relative pro-
bative value of an item of evidence is not determined in a vacu-
um. It is well established that when evidence poses a risk of 
prejudice, the trial court should look at whether other evidence 
exists that is at least equally probative for the same issue but 
less prejudicial.335 A proponent of an item of evidence need not 
submit the least prejudicial piece of evidence, but the existence 
of an equally probative but less prejudicial alternative can re-
duce the probative value of the evidence being introduced.336 If 
the probative value is decreased to such a degree that the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs it, the trial 
court has discretion to exclude the evidence. 
When no admissible alternatives to an item of evidence ex-
ist, this also impacts the Rule 403 analysis. Traditionally, a 
lack of alternatives makes the evidence more necessary.337 The 
more a piece of evidence is necessary, the more probative it is 
considered.338 While this logic is generally sound, it is question-
able when the only item of evidence to prove a point poses a 
significant risk of racial prejudice, particularly in the criminal 
context. It is inherently unfair to base a defendant’s guilt even 
in part on racist evidence. 
It is also well established that a trial court must look at the 
evidence that exists in the entire record to weigh the probative 
value versus the danger of unfair prejudice.339 However, when 
evidence poses the risk of racial prejudice, this traditional 
analysis is inadequate because it fails to consider the ability (or 
lack of ability) to bring counterevidence. In a Rule 403 analysis, 
particularly in a criminal case, when there is a risk of racial 
prejudice, the court should also consider the party’s ability to 
 
 335. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183–84. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes (providing that 
when a court considers “whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice,” 
the “availability of other means of proof may . . . be an appropriate factor”). 
 338. See JONES, supra note 226, § 17:11 (noting that when an item of evi-
dence becomes more necessary on a particular issue, it is “therefore more pro-
bative”). 
 339. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183. 
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introduce evidence to oppose the racial prejudice. Some courts 
have hinted at such an approach by considering a criminal de-
fendant’s financial availability to oppose the government’s evi-
dence. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Serge, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the trial court’s decision to 
admit the commonwealth’s computer generated animated 
(CGA) film depicting its version of the defendant’s murder of 
his wife.340 It was the first CGA demonstrative evidence ever 
admitted in a criminal trial, and it purportedly cost the com-
monwealth between $10,000 and $20,000 to produce.341 In re-
viewing the trial court’s Pennsylvania Rule 403 ruling that the 
probative value of the film was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, five of six justices agreed that 
the defendant’s inability to afford his own CGA film or an ex-
pert’s rebuttal could be properly considered in balancing unfair 
prejudice against probative value.342 Additionally, according to 
one informal study of United States district and magistrate 
judges from 2007, seven out of fifteen judges indicated they 
would consider the parties’ economic circumstances when “de-
ciding the admissibility or use of computer-generated presenta-
tions.”343 In criminal cases where the prejudice posed relates to 
racial concerns and not merely financial means, considering the 
defendant’s ability to counter the government’s evidence is even 
more critical. 
To begin to eliminate the dual-race evidentiary system, 
lawyers and judges should approach evidence arguments and 
determinations with critical race awareness and inquiry, assert 
proper objections, and demand that the racialized reality of all 
races be treated equally under the law of evidence. Judges and 
attorneys must take proactive steps to make it more feasible for 
people of color to share their racialized experiences and to ex-
pose systemic racism in litigation. To permit this end, lay and 
expert witnesses must be allowed to testify on topics of system-
ic racism more liberally. 
For instance, when relevant, witnesses of color should be 
permitted to testify about their lived experiences of racial strat-
 
 340. 896 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2006). 
 341. Id. at 1189 (Castille, J., concurring). 
 342. Id. at 1190; id. at 1188 (Cappy, C.J., concurring). 
 343. Victor G. Savikas & David L. Silverman, Making the Poverty Objec-
tion, NAT’L L.J., July 26, 1999, at C6. 
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ification without exclusion as impermissible opinion evidence.344 
An example might be a criminal defendant calling a witness to 
counter the government’s evidence of flight. A lay witness from 
the defendant’s community, if qualified, should be granted 
leave to testify about how flight by people of color from police is 
the norm in that community. Such testimony would be relevant 
because it has a tendency to show that running from authori-
ties is normal and thus not particularly probative of the de-
fendant’s consciousness of guilt. This evidence could be used to 
prevent the government’s use of flight evidence or to at least 
rebut its probativeness. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 allows 
lay opinions, providing that: 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an 
opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s 
perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimo-
ny or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 
702.345 
Rule 701’s first requirement is closely related to the personal 
knowledge requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 602.346 Like 
all witnesses (except experts certified under Rule 702), a wit-
ness offering a lay opinion must have personal knowledge 
about the community and how residents generally interact with 
law enforcement. A witness from the defendant’s community 
could testify and form an opinion based upon his or her person-
al firsthand observations of people of color avoiding and fleeing 
from authorities in that area because of distrust or fear of the 
police. The fact that a witness’s opinion that black or brown 
flight is the norm in their community might be based, at least 
in part, on what the witness heard from others does not make it 
hearsay.347 As these firsthand observations are based on experi-
ences from everyday life rather than scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge, Rule 701(c) would be satisfied. 
 
 344. See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 345. Id. 
 346. See FED. R. EVID. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evi-
dence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has per-
sonal knowledge of the matter.”). 
 347. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 318, § 7:3 (“Knowledge is social 
. . . [,] one’s social interactions and the knowledge that grows out of these in-
teractions, including what one hears from others and says to them. Although 
these interactions, and the knowledge that grows out of them, may to some 
extent reflect what one says and has heard, the personal knowledge require-
ment can be satisfied. Indeed, sometimes the subject of lay opinion testimony 
necessarily conveys what others have said.”). 
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Further, because of the racial segregation or centralization 
of most neighborhoods,348 it is likely that the witness would be a 
person of color. As the person-of-color thesis posits, minorities 
are particularly well-equipped to understand the lived experi-
ences of institutional racism. With respect to subsection (b) of 
Rule 701, this testimony would be helpful to determine if flight 
is customary in the community and thus whether the defend-
ant’s flight is probative of his or her consciousness of guilt. As 
juries are usually not truly representative of the communities 
from which they are derived, particularly in terms of race, ju-
rors would not ordinarily be familiar with this information. 
More importantly, the testimony would bring a racial-minority 
perspective into the courtroom and work to counteract white 
normativity and transparency problems that are rampant in 
today’s criminal justice system. 
Likewise, expert witnesses349 must be allowed to testify 
about systemic racism more liberally. Consider cross-racial 
identifications. Experts on the inadequacy of eyewitness testi-
mony are desperately needed since “[e]yewitness misidentifica-
tion is the leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United 
States,”350 and a large percentage of eyewitness misidentifica-
tions involve cross-racial identifications.351 Cross-racial identifi-
cations are particularly unreliable when a white eyewitness 
identifies a black suspect.352 Traditionally, courts have been 
hostile to expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony.353 However, expert witness testimony is more effec-
 
 348. Galster, supra note 274, at 1431 (“[V]irtually all of our major metro-
politan areas where large numbers of minorities live are highly segregated.”). 
Additionally, communities consisting mostly of minorities are the communities 
most likely to be subject to police brutality. See supra notes 187–188 and ac-
companying text. 
 349. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 350. Lauren Tallent, Through the Lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403: An 
Examination of Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony Admissibility in 
the Federal Circuit Courts, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 765, 769 (2011). 
 351. According to the Innocence Project, nearly one-third of all wrongful 
convictions overturned by DNA testing involved cross-racial identification. 
Cross-Racial Identification and Jury Instruction, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 
20, 2008), http://www.innocenceproject.org/cross-racial-identification-and-jury 
-instruction. 
 352. Specifically, “a Black innocent suspect has a [fifty-six percent] greater 
chance of being misidentified by a White eyewitness than by a Black eyewit-
ness.” Tallent, supra note 350, at 770 n.38 (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79 (2008); Fradella, supra note 295, at 14). 
 353. Fradella, supra note 295, at 4. 
  
2017] CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 2311 
 
tive than its alternatives, such as jury instructions.354 Both lay 
and expert witness testimony on racialized reality evidence of 
people of color could amplify the often-silenced voices at trial. 
  CONCLUSION   
Litigation is often compared to battle. At trial, evidence 
rules and doctrines are the metaphorical swords that allow evi-
dence to be entered into the record and the shields that exclude 
evidence. The manner in which evidence law is applied deter-
mines the facts that are considered in deciding who wins and 
loses. For trials to be fair, it is imperative that evidence law 
applies equally to everyone irrespective of their race. Histori-
cally and presently, evidence law has been applied in ways that 
structurally disadvantage people of color and advantage whites. 
Continuing legal education on implicit racial bias and prefer-
ences—particularly on recognizing white normativity and 
transparency; proper objections; and increased evidentiary 
pathways for expert witnesses and people of color to share their 
experiences of minority racialized reality and systemic rac-
ism—would increase racial equity in the courtroom. 
But racism will still persist in our evidence law. Structural 
racism is an unremitting impediment to full justice that re-
quires continual resistance. Fortunately, we have an intellec-
tual armory at our fingertips: the work of generations of CRT 
scholars waiting to be applied to the law of evidence. 
The ideas and examples I provide in this Article are merely 
a starting point. I hope they inspire a new and robust critical 
race theory of evidence. 
 
 354. Tallent, supra note 350, at 776–77. 
